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Abstract 
Development aid is very complex, multifaceted and disputable topic which has changed 
tremendously since the modern development aid started after the World War II. 
Development aid has witnessed a number of different “phases” – once having a focus on 
economic growth, then on poverty reduction, and then on providing aid in order to achieve 
one’s self-interests. To start with, this thesis seeks to open the complex framework of 
development aid, give a brief overview of its history, introduce its key IR concepts, and 
show what is the motivation for countries to provide it. There are a number of questions 
in development aid which do not have one right and clear answer – does development aid 
work or not? Is it effective? It is important to study the factors affecting the provision of 
effective development aid because it could help finding out if the provision of aid needs 
only fine-tuning or fundamental changes. The framework which is the basis for the 
analysis consists of seven different factors that could affect the provision of aid. These 
factors are knowledge of local conditions, tied aid, aid fragmentation, security, 
corruption, targeting and timing. Some of these factors are donor-dependent, some 
recipient-dependent. The focus of this thesis is on Ukraine because since the Revolution 
of Dignity the need for development aid has increased rapidly and Ukraine has become a 
huge arena for the international donors. Ukraine is also always “in the picture” because 
of the ongoing war in the eastern part of the country. All the studied factors can be applied 
to the context of Ukraine and the most relevant out of them is the knowledge of local 
conditions together with aid fragmentation, targeting and timing. Other three – tied aid, 
corruption and security are not, at least in the case of Ukraine, factors which can affect 
much the provision of effective development aid. 
Keywords: development aid, Ukraine, factors affecting the provision of aid, aid 
effectiveness 
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Introduction 
“In the early, naïve days, the idea of development was encapsulated by a widely repeated 
proverb: “Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach him to fish, and you feed 
him for life.” But knowing how to fish often turned out to be the least of his – or her – 
problems. The river might be polluted, and the catch depleted. The trees from which boats 
were traditionally built had been cut down by loggers, or the right to fish on that 
waterway granted to others with powerful patrons and larger boats.” 
Maggie Black (2007: 117) 
This shows well the complex nature of development aid. It shows that aid may have 
several variables which, if not taken into account, could lead to completely opposite 
results than initially planned. World Bank stated in 1998 that foreign aid has been “very 
effective, totally ineffective, and everything in between at various times and places” (van 
Lieshout et al., 2010: 95). Development aid is like a black box where one puts resources 
to the box from one end and then does not have a clear understanding of what is coming 
out of the box from another end in the form of results. The reason is that it is unclear what 
is in the box that could affect what is coming out. 
One could not say that the issue of aid is not studied enough. It is researched if and how 
aid can affect political stability (see Steinwand, 2014) or how democracy aid affects civil 
conflict (see Savun and Tirone, 2011). The question of aid effectiveness has been 
researched too (see Easterly, 2007; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007). At first, it seems 
that there is nothing to study in this area anymore. Still, development aid is one of the 
most disputable concepts in economic and foreign policy. “A passionate debate has 
developed which has addressed fundamental questions, but in which examples are happily 
quoted out of context and stereotypes are rife” (van Lieshout et al., 2010: 13). 
Consequently, this research aims to gain a better understanding of the development aid 
while assessing the provision of aid critically. “In short, after sixty years, the ways in 
which development cooperation is provided, the motives that underlie it, the instruments 
that are used, and the organizational form that has evolved are still very much in flux. 
How are we to assess and respond to this?” (Ibid., 22). 
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To the best of my knowledge, there is not much written about the factors affecting the 
provision of development aid. Riddell (2007) writes in his comprehensive book, amongst 
other things, how (in)effective is foreign aid and what could be the problem behind it not 
working, but it rather covers the aid impact part. Van Lieshout et al. (2010: 136-140) 
write about designing development aid and they are pointing out the problems which 
providing aid can cause – accountability, mutual dependencies, “ownership” and 
“participation” – which could be taken as the factors I am trying to map, but again, it is 
more about post-provision of aid. I mean it more on a broader level – the factors one must 
think about before planning an intervention and then implementing it. In the end, it will 
all affect the effectiveness of aid and could be accountable for the problems it causes. 
These factors can be related to the aid organisation (for example, rushing to the recipient 
country without having a clear idea of what and how to do), recipient country (level of 
corruption or an ongoing war) or something completely different. 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to determine the possible factors that can affect the 
provision of development aid. In order not to be overly general, I have set a clearer focus 
and I am using Ukraine as an example case. The reasoning behind that is explained under 
research design and methodology chapter. One part of choosing Ukraine is also personal 
experience – having lived, studied and worked there for almost a year has given me a 
deeper interest in this country and a desire to study the chosen topic in-depth. The utmost 
goal of this paper is adding a valuable contribution to the never-ending discussion over 
development aid. Taking it all into consideration, this thesis seeks to answer two research 
questions: 
RQ1: What are the most important factors affecting the provision of effective 
development aid? 
RQ2: How could these factors be applied to Ukrainian context? 
This thesis is divided into four major chapters. It starts with introducing the theoretical 
framework on development aid, aid effectiveness and possible factors essential for the 
analytical part. Development aid part is, in turn, divided into smaller sub-chapters to 
better grasp what really lies behind this seemingly simple term. In order to talk about the 
provision of effective development aid, one needs to understand what aid effectiveness 
all about is. In addition, there are sub-chapters dedicated to the key IR concepts of 
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development and the motivation of providing it. Only after that it is possible to move on 
with possible factors. Second chapter is dedicated to describing the research design and 
methodology. Third chapter provides the overview of the chosen recipient country – 
Ukraine – and four donor countries – Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Estonia. Fourth, 
and the last chapter in this list, is analysis together with the problems with development 
aid through the eyes of practitioners, and a brief retrospect to the provided aid in Ukraine 
Findings of this research are summarised in the discussion part. 
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1. Theoretical framework 
“The central purpose of development is the realization of the potentialities of the human 
person in harmony with the community; the human person is the subject not the object of 
development, both material and non-material needs must be satisfied; respect for human 
rights is fundamental; the opportunity for full participation must be recorded; the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination must be respected; and a degree of 
individual and collective self-reliance must be achieved.” 
Philip Alston, 1981: 102 (as cited in Gready and Ensor, 2005: 18) 
1.1. Development aid 
Before talking specifically about development aid, we need to take a step back and start 
with foreign aid. At the broadest sense, as Riddell (2007: 17) puts it, foreign aid is all the 
resources – physical goods, skills and technical know-how, financial grants or loans – 
that donors transfer to recipients. It is important to distinguish two types of foreign aid1 – 
humanitarian aid and development aid2. Humanitarian aid is providing a needs-based 
emergency response aimed at preserving life, preventing and alleviating human suffering 
and maintaining human dignity, wherever the need arises, if governments are unable or 
unwilling to act (European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, 2017). Development aid is 
meant to support developing countries, whether it is an economic, political or social 
development. Although there is a connection between development aid and poverty, 
social and political tensions, and international stability and security, both humanitarian 
and development aid are considered separately from military and national defence 
(Pihlak, 2008: 157). 
Being related and often mixed with one another, these two have several important 
differences. Firstly, when humanitarian aid is short-term and meant for saving lives right 
after the crisis has occurred, then development aid projects are usually long-term. 
Secondly, when humanitarian aid is meant for countries having suffered or suffering from 
natural disasters or man-made conflicts, then development aid is for developing countries 
(they may but they do not necessarily have to be the same country). Lastly, when 
                                                          
1 Foreign aid in the context of this thesis means always development aid, unless it is stated otherwise. 
2 Also development cooperation, development assistance, official development assistance (ODA). 
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humanitarian aid focuses on saving lives by providing food, emergency shelter and urgent 
medical care, then development aid is focusing on systematic changes – political reforms, 
reducing poverty, fighting against corruption. (The Humanitarian Coalition, no date) 
Often there is no clear borderline between humanitarian and development aid. For 
example, Veronika Svištš (Interview, 11.04.2018), an Estonian aid expert, argued how 
humanitarian and development aid interventions go hand-in-hand: it is not that 
humanitarian aid suddenly ends and development aid starts but often these two are given 
in parallel. Mostly, though, it is the case for smaller aid organisations who have the ability 
to change their interventions according to the situations. “But how do you know you are 
done with relief and are into development?” - Barnett (Anyangwe, 2015) argues how the 
line between humanitarian and development aid is blurred. “The majority of places where 
you have an humanitarian crisis are places or countries where those crises have been 
going on for at least eight years but often more than 20 years, and sometimes as long as 
30 or 40 years” (Ibid.). 
1.1.1. How has development aid “developed”? 
It is disputable when giving development aid started – some refer to Adam Smith and his 
“Wealth of Nations” where he discussed the “causes of the prosperity of the new 
colonies” (Edwards, 2014), others cite “the dawn of settled agriculture 10 000 years ago 
as the moment the development train left the station” (Black, 2007: 15). Phillips (2013) 
writes how rich countries started to help poorer in the 19th century and by the 1920s and 
1930s aid from Great Britain, France and Germany to their colonies was provided 
regularly. It is also said that the modern era of giving aid started in the late 1940s with 
the ambitious Marshall Plan3 in 1948 to help build up Europe which was destroyed during 
the World War II (Riddell, 2007: 24; Edwards, 2014: 24; Bauer, 1974: 15). On the other 
hand, this ignores completely the fact that before 1940s most of the aid was given by 
voluntary agencies. “During much of the colonial period, it was voluntary associations – 
often churches and church-based agencies – and not rich country governments which 
were the main providers of key services to poor people within and across most poor 
                                                          
3 Marshall Plan – the programme that transferred over $13 billion in order to reconstruct the post-World 
War II Western Europe – is considered to be one of the greatest and most successful achievements in 
economic and foreign policy (De Long and Eichengreen, 1991: 4-5). 
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countries” (Lumsdaine, 1993: 193 as cited in Riddell, 2007: 25). It is complicated to 
determine the starting point because development is an ongoing change which is 
”influenced to varying degrees and at different times by diverse pressures: dominant 
political ideologies; particular regional circumstances; trends in academic and non-
governmental discourse; and the continuing failure to generate lasting solutions to 
poverty and human security (Gready and Ensor, 2005: 14). 
From Marshall Plan to ODA 
In order not to get confused with the history of development aid, I will use the Marshall 
Plan as the starting point. Dutch government4 already had first funds available in 1949 
for development aid while receiving aid through the Marshall Plan itself. Back then, 
Dutch aid policy was shaped by the process of decolonization (van Lieshout et al., 2010: 
25). Many countries in the beginning felt themselves obliged to aid their former colonies 
– “in France, the Ministry for the Colonies was divided into two ministerial departments: 
one for “related states” and one for French overseas territories. In the United Kingdom 
too, an aid system was constructed which was grafted strongly on old relationships and 
institutions” (Stokke, 2009 as cited in van Lieshout et al., 2010: 25). 
1960s changed the way development was seen – “characterised by anti-poverty initiatives 
and welfare and gender strategies, and as a “broad-based, people-oriented or endogenous 
process, as a critique of modernisation and as a break with past development history” 
(Elliot, 2002: 45 as cited in Gready and Ensor, 2005: 15). In the 1960s the understanding 
of aid started to change as well – “the northern European donors like Sweden, which 
historically had not had colonies… started to recognise the need and started to develop 
aid programs in particular focus countries” (Phillips, 2013). 1960s were the golden years 
for development aid – aid was strongly supported, more donors were providing aid in 
larger quantities and it seemed that it was working (Riddell, 2007: 29). Also, more 
resources were devoted to health, education and strengthening skills and human capital 
(Edwards, 2014). UNICEF (no date) even declared the 1960s a “Decade of Development” 
and President Kennedy launched the Decade with the following: “To those peoples in the 
huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge 
                                                          
4 Western countries have had a rather similar view to development aid, hence it makes sense to use the 
Dutch example. 
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our best efforts to help them help themselves.” Greatest success stories that could describe 
the “Decade of Development” are South Korea and Taiwan. South Korea may have had 
autocratic-repressive military leadership but its flexible approach to economic 
development resulted in what was called the “miracle on the Han River” (Britannica, no 
date). 
ODA 
1960s marked also the institutionalisation of Official Development Assistance (ODA). 
By the definition of OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), ODA is 
“government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and 
welfare of developing countries” (OECD, 2018). “ODA is the resource flow to countries 
and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients5 and to multilateral development 
institutions that are provided by official agencies, including state and local governments 
(or by their executive agencies), concessional and administered with the promotion of the 
economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective” 
(Ibid.). When foreign aid is mostly divided as humanitarian aid and development aid, then 
ODA (which is often used as a synonym to development aid) can be both for developing 
long-term projects and providing humanitarian aid in emergencies (Agence Française de 
Développement, no date). The implementers of ODA are always local actors – ministries, 
local authorities, NGOs – who are always working for the same aim – helping local people 
(Ibid.). In order to help administering the volume of ODA (which was rapidly expanding), 
a number of new multilateral aid organisations and institutions were established. This 
optimism, though – increase of aid and rates of growth – did not last long because by 
1970, ODA expansion had stopped and large donors, for example United States, had 
already reduced the level of aid (Riddell, 2007: 29). With the end of history6, one of the 
main drivers behind ODA – geopolitics – had disappeared. “International solidarity was 
no longer part of a “grand scheme”, it was no longer considered as a strategic public 
policy” (Severino and Ray, 2009: 3). ODA started to rise again in mid-1980s – by 1990, 
it had almost doubled to $53 billion (Riddell, 2007: 36). 
                                                          
5 DAC List of ODA Recipients (OECD, no date) 
6 Said by Francis Fukuyama 
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The leading contributor to ODA today is European Union with its member states – in 
2017 it was €72,65 billion. This, though, was 3% less than in 2016 but this decrease does 
not necessarily mean a negative trend because it is “justified by the reduction in debt relief 
and in-donor refugee costs, two elements that, together with imputed student costs, tied 
aid and interest repayments, do not contribute to positive development in partner 
countries” (CONCORD, 2018: 6). According to CONCORD7, not all the money reported 
as ODA contributes to development, thus it is important to distinguish inflated aid from 
genuine. For the improvement of provision of development aid, it is necessary to decrease 
inflated and increase genuine aid. If in 2016, €16,4 billion or 22% of aid was inflated, 
then in 2017, the corresponding figures were €14 billion and 19% (CONCORD, 2018:  
12). Following items should not be considered as ODA (Ibid.): 
• spending on receiving refugees in the donor country; 
• the reduction in development effectiveness associated with the additional cost of 
tied aid, in this report estimated at 15% of partially tied aid and 30% of tied aid; 
• spending on international students in the donor country; 
• interest repayments on concessional loans, which should instead be considered a 
“negative” budget item; 
• debt relief and future interest on cancelled debts. 
As it is seen above, the last 30 years for development aid, especially to the money 
allocated by the donors, has been like a ride on the roller coaster. The last decade of the 
20th century started with what Collier and Dollar (2004: 244) call aid pessimism – donors 
had little control of aid spending (it was wasted by the governments of recipient 
countries), despite of large amount of money allocated for aid, recipient countries were 
still suffering in poverty. “ODA continued to fall for a number of years, with the 
pessimistic mood fed by the public prominence given to the latest round of academic 
studies which concluded that aid “didn’t work” (Riddell, 2007: 38). Severino and Ray 
(2009) in their working paper were criticising heavily ODA being a long-outdated 
concept to it measuring too much to it measuring too little. “All in all, ODA turns out to 
                                                          
7 The European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development 
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be a poor benchmark for the emerging global public policy enriched of new objectives, 
actors and instruments. To sum up, it is not an indicator of results, but only an indicator 
of means (Severino and Ray, 2009: 21). 
21st century 
In 2000, 191 UN member states signed the UN Millennium Declaration and committed 
to fight against the poverty, hunger, illiteracy etc. Altogether, world leaders promised to 
achieve eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the year 2015 (United Nations, 
no date). Millennium Development Goals also marked a new conceptual change in 
development aid – although development aid and development cooperation have been 
considered synonyms, then Goal Eight “to develop global partnerships for development” 
stated the importance of working together between developed (donor) and developing 
(recipient) countries. This was the point when development aid started to be seen as 
development cooperation. It is still disputable whether the Millennium Development 
Goals have made much of a difference (see report by McArthur and Rasmussen, 2017) 
but now the world has an even bigger aim to achieve – 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDG) which is a continuation to MDGs. These SDGs have more chance to be successful 
than the predecessor because they are better-explained, and SDGs have also 169 
supporting targets which should make the goals better achievable (United Nations, no 
date). As SDGs are such an important issue, more and more aid agencies are planning and 
implementing their interventions accordingly: “Whereas the MDGs identified actions to 
be taken in developing countries with support from developed countries, the SDGs have 
recast development as a shared, universal enterprise. The SDGs seek to spur action toward 
addressing common problems and all countries are expected to evaluate how the SDGs 
could be implemented in their national context” (Paul, 2016). 
Today, development assistance is a lot about achieving one’s strategic interests8. The best 
example here is China who has been especially active in Africa within the last 10 years. 
First and foremost, China seeks ways to improve its economy and African countries are 
a perfect hotbed for that – plenty of resources, local markets and possibilities for 
employment for Chinese people (Sun, 2014). Another important factor here is seeking for 
                                                          
8 This argument is discussed more under the „Motivation for providing aid“ sub-chapter. 
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the support to “one China” policy. While both China and DAC donors have stated that 
aid is provided for pursuing their strategic interests, China is more open about the fact 
that its aid is mutually beneficial (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015: 1019). Being mutual for both 
sides or not, Chinese development aid is something every potential recipient country 
should have a critical approach to (Ibid.). The best-case scenario is that this aid really 
contributes to the development of a recipient country but the worst case scenario could 
be similar to Hambantota port which Sri Lanka had to hand over to China on a century-
long lease because Sri Lanka could not fulfil the conditions China had set (Abi-Habib, 
2018). 
What is more, the beginning of 21st century belongs to the discussion over development 
and development aid. “The way people understand and think about development is in a 
state of constant churn and upheaval… New concepts are borrowed from other 
disciplines, such as medicine and physics, or from rich-world debates” (Green, 2011). He 
also adds that “the challenge for those engaged in aid, development and politics is to 
continue that effort, responding to the new challenges that face us, so that poverty and 
hunger in the coming decades rapidly go to the way of slavery in the 19th century.” 
Bunting (2011), in her article, argues also about the future of development and she 
suggests two possible scenarios – optimistic and pessimistic. According to her positive 
scenario, aid has moved from state business to global people power; China, India and 
Brazil have taken the key position in development because European and US models of 
development were too conditional and heavy-handedly controlled and interfered, and 
European countries, once major players, have become marginal in Africa. Her pessimistic 
scenario suggests that most European states have ended their aid operations due to them 
being too ineffective; money which has gone to poor African countries, has repeatedly 
gone astray, and there are more celebrity-driven “good cause” projects (Ibid.). It is 
important to add that these two scenarios are only a game of thought which should help 
us understand the challenges we have when it comes to development and providing aid. 
1.1.2. Key concepts in development cooperation 
There is no one way how development aid fits into International Relations (IR). There are 
several IR theories and concepts which could be related to development aid, thus the aim 
of this sub-chapter is to give a short overview of how IR is viewing it. Knutsen (1997 as 
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cited in Chou and Poole, 2015: 40) argues that theories “bring to light phenomena that 
may have previously been invisible and, by doing so, enable us to better comprehend its 
nature.” In addition to theories, there is a concept-based approach to development aid in 
IR. Related concepts could help us better grasp and understand such a comprehensive 
topic. Development aid in IR cannot be explained only by IR theories because in certain 
extent, theories tend to stay too vague and they do not give the “full picture”. When 
“theories are general statements that describe and explain the causes or effects of classes 
of phenomena” (Evera, 1997: 7-8), then concepts help us emphasising things we want to 
examine in the research. Concepts, however, are part of IR theories, and below I am trying 
to connect them to relevant theories. 
To start with, we should take into consideration the first one from the Great Debates - a 
debate between idealism and realism which is based on a claim that idealism wants to see 
the world as it should be, but realism sees the world as it is (Berg et al., 2018: 59). 
Development aid through the idealism lense means that aid is provided for making the 
world a better place; that aid contributes to economic growth and poverty reduction and 
that provision of aid really is effective. According to realism theory, states do act in order 
to get the most out of it for themselves and to ensure the security which is their main 
interest (Ibid., 61). When it comes to security, then in development aid it is expressed in 
several ways – for example, aid to Ukraine to keep it closer to the West and to deter 
Russia, or aid to African countries to reduce poverty and thus keeping the illegal 
migration under control. Motivation to interfere to the development of another country 
may differ across countries but the will to assure the security in your region and the safe 
development of your country is most probably one of these motivations (Pihlak, 2008: 
158). Realists, as Chou and Poole (2015: 51) argue, are often regarded as pessimists. This 
also describes aid opponents who criticise that aid is not working, i.e. it is not effective. 
Another theory that fits here is liberalism which has developed from idealism school of 
thought. If for idealism-realism the only actors were states, then in the light of liberalism, 
actors are also international organisations, companies and individuals (Ibid., 45) and the 
main interest is not only security but also well-being (Berg et al., 2018: 79). Well-being 
in development aid often tends to be about donor country not the recipient, although in 
essence, it should be the contrary. 
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Second way, now concept-based, how development aid fits into IR is through 
globalisation and global problems, such as poverty, famine and climate change, which 
affect us all. Globalisation, as Stiglitz (2002 as cited in Huwart and Verdier, 2013) puts 
it, is “the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been 
brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, 
and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, 
knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders.” Opponents of globalisation 
blame it for global inequality – an income cap between developed and developing 
countries - which has increased generally in recent decades together with the enlargement 
of globalisation (Ha and Kim, 2016: 257). Problem here is that not all the countries and 
people get the equal share from the closer integration which, in turn, results in before 
mentioned global problems which, in turn, could be solved through development aid.  
Globalisation and global problems lead us to Complex Interdependence Theory 
introduced by Keohane and Nye. This theory “stresses the complex ways in which as a 
result of growing ties, the transnational actors become mutually dependent, vulnerable to 
each other’s actions and sensitive to each other’s needs” (Rana, 2015: 291). To ascertain 
the scale of interdependence, Keohane and Nye suggest two measures – sensitivity (how 
the actions of one state affect the other), and vulnerability (are there any alternative 
options to decrease the impact of one state’s actions to another) (Berg et al., 2018: 69). 
In addition to Complex Interdependence Theory, globalisation proponents use liberalism 
(free market and wealth created through the division of labour) and neoliberalism 
(minimal state intervention) to explain it from theoretical point of view (Ha and Kim, 
2016: 260-262); on the other hand, globalisation opponents refer to Marxism (developing 
countries are exploited by advanced countries), structuralism (existing international 
system is structurally biased in favour of rich countries, thus developing countries will be 
exploited by developed countries) and dependency theory (the North has made the South 
dependent on first one’s capital for short-term profits) (Ha and Kim, 2016: 264). 
Thirdly, development aid is related to IR through norms. Björkdahl (2002: 9) writes that 
norms are important because they provide motivation for actions, thus guide our 
behaviour. International relations and global arena as a whole are regulated by the norms; 
norms are what makes the international order (Berg et al., 2018: 149). “A state which 
does not conform to certain standards of behaviour towards its own citizens and more 
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particularly, towards foreigners will be branded as “uncivilized”” (Carr, 1981: 141). 
Lancaster (2007 as cited in Apodaca, 2017: 5) argues how providing foreign aid has 
become an international norm. “The allocation of foreign aid has become an accepted and 
expected standard of behaviour among developed states, a standard that is now being 
recognised among a greater number of middle-income states” (Apodaca, 2017: 5). Norms 
are changing in time (think about slavery or colonialism) and so is development aid – 
what is considered aid today, may be seem irrelevant in 10-20 years.  
Fourthly, development aid can be viewed through the concept of soft power which was 
introduced by Joseph Nye. Soft power, as Nye (1990: 166) puts it, is “the power of 
attractive ideas or the ability to set the political agenda and determine the framework of 
debate in a way that shapes others’ preferences.” Soft power means the transformation of 
power to less transferable, coercive and tangible (Ibid., 167). Nye was looking soft power 
from U.S. point of view. “For Nye, the basis of U.S. soft power was liberal democratic 
politics, free market economics, and fundamental values such as human rights – in 
essence, liberalism (Li, 2018). When Trump announced the cuts to foreign aid in 2017, 
then many lawmakers criticised this decision by saying that foreign aid “is a form of soft 
power, helping the United States achieve its interests in the world without resorting to 
more forceful tactics (Bermeo, 2017). There are a plethora of aid projects aiming to 
promote democratisation, improve economy and strengthen human rights.9  
To sum it up, there are several ways how IR views development aid. I find these theories 
and concepts being the most important. This list, though, is not exhaustive, and one could 
find many more which could fit here, but I tried to give a comprehensive overview of 
development aid in IR. The bottom line is that development aid is a vast area and different 
actors take and understand it differently. That explains why not everybody has the same 
motivation to provide aid or why there is not one and right way to measure its 
effectiveness. Concepts work as a bridge between the theory and the real wold; between 
what is written in the literature on development and what is said by the practitioners 
working on the field. Thus, the aim of this sub-chapter is helping to analyse the factors 
explained below (sub-chapter 1.3) in the analytical part of this thesis (chapter 4).  
                                                          
9 Below it is written more about how these four donor countries are focusing on these areas in Ukraine. 
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1.1.3. Motivation for providing aid 
Around 1% ($39.3 billion in 2019 (USAID, 2018)) of United States’ Federal Budget’ is 
allocated for foreign aid each year. Although United States and USAID are only one 
example, it is a common understanding that the amount of money flowing to the aid 
industry globally is overwhelming. This is explained by realism theory which states that 
countries do everything to ensure their security, and the concept of globalisation-global 
problems. Taking into consideration the amount of global problems the whole world has 
to deal with, it sounds reasonable that development requires a lot of resources. People 
tend to understand that the main reason to provide development aid is to help poor 
countries to prevent the creation and diffusion of conflicts; in fact, development 
cooperation does not prevent nor resolve crises, nor does it alone stop the illegal 
immigration from Africa to Europe (Solnik, 2017). Better offer is that aid is provided to 
reduce global poverty and achieve sustainable development goals. But in reality, it is also 
only half the truth. What is the driving force behind the provision of aid? Van Lieshout 
et al. (2010: 26), for example, brings out self-interest and morality as two basic motives 
for development aid. Riddell (2007: 91-92) adds solidarity, historical ties and affecting 
states with a poor record of following human rights. The aim of this chapter is to elaborate 
these motives and see if there is any other to add to the already mentioned ones. 
Self-interest as a motivation means that countries provide aid to get something in return. 
Realism is IR theory that explains self-interest the best. “Realism reveals what liberal 
institutionalist “theory” obscures: namely, that international institutions serve primarily 
national rather than international interests” (Waltz, 2000: 21). Waltz developed the idea 
of neorealism which also states the importance of national interest, though it sees 
cooperation as a mean for achieving one’s goals (Berg et al., 2018: 62). Van Lieshout et 
al. (2010: 31-32) distinguishes here three options – money, stability and influence. “For 
decades, commercial interests in all major donor countries have lobbied to gain access to 
aid funds, usually based on a “win-win” or mutual interest argument… jobs and exports 
will be expanded at home at the same time as development is boosted abroad” (Riddell, 
2007: 99). Achieving commercial interests, mostly, means using “tying” the aid. This 
occurs when “a donor requires that aid recipients purchase the equipment… or other 
commodities made in the donor country or from the donor’s corporations; use contractors 
or consultants from the donor country; or that the equipment be shipped via ships or 
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airplanes flagged in the donor country” (Apodaca, 2017: 7). Biggest aid-tiers historically 
have been USA, Greece, Canada and Austria; on the other hand, for example, Norway 
and Ireland have not tied their aid (Radelet, 2006 as cited in Apodaca, 2017: 7). This is a 
trend where instead of contributing to the wealthier and more stable world, donor 
countries are thinking more to their narrow interests, which, when considering the 
smallness, fragility and interdependence of the world today, is rather a short-sighted 
policy (Solnik, 2017). 
Secondly, van Lieshout et al. (2010: 31-32) writes about influence as an option for self-
interest motive. Riddell (2007: 96) writes: “The influence of non-developmental motives 
in the allocation of aid has varied, but for most, it has always been, and continue today, 
to be important.” Van Lieshout (2010: 32) adds that influence option is more used by 
smaller countries because it helps them to buy “a place at a table” which would allow 
them to make their voice heard. “Large countries are always able to make in impact in 
international arena… small countries carry less weight and development aid is one of the 
ways (Van Lieshout, 2010: 32). But it is not applicable only to smaller countries. China 
also uses this approach to influence other countries to support its “One China” policy (for 
example, providing aid for the non-recognition of Taiwan).  
Last option for self-interest motive, according to van Lieshout et al. (2010: 32), is 
improving stability. This is especially relevant today when tens of millions of people are 
on the move in order to find themselves a better and more humane place for living. 
Development aid could be the way to halt the migration flow – improving the living 
conditions by providing aid and investing to the least developed countries should reduce 
the number of people who want to migrate only for economic reasons. On the other hand, 
one could argue over the usefulness of this approach considering how much resources 
have been provided to Africa, and how many people from Africa have already migrated 
to Europe or still waiting for their opportunity to do so. There is no stability without 
security. Pihlak (2008: 158) states that providing development aid is one part of state’s 
foreign affairs activities, which implicitly improves state’s own security. In her article, 
she brings out that the question of security should be viewed more widely than only from 
military point of view – for example, political instability, failed states, poverty, increasing 
inequality, scarcity of resources, overpopulation, uncontrollable migration etc (Ibid., 164-
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165). Taking it into account, then development aid is provided to maintain the stability in 
order to reduce security risks. 
Could it be that aid is provided for the sake of raising one’s self-esteem and making it 
(donor) feel better and more superior than other (recipient)? Bauer (1974: 17) blames 
development aid for being patronising: “… but our gifts are still supposed to be 
indispensable for their advance. Whatever happens to them is supposed to depend on us, 
which makes us feel superior even as we express feelings of guilt. We go on in our 
patronising way by calling the recipients of hand-outs partners in progress, as if they were 
children unaware of simple realities.” His argument is supported by the Secret Aid 
Worker10 (2016) who argues how a lot in development sector is done only for making 
donors feel better about using (neo-colonial) practices which do not benefit aid recipients 
at all. 
1.1.4. Criticism of development aid 
Together with being one of the most disputable issues in economic and foreign policy, it 
has also been heavily criticised. Taking constructive criticism into account is a driving 
force to improve providing aid. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to give an overview of 
how different authors have argued against the development aid. Here I have brought out 
three arguments against – aid being unquestionable, money and regress. Later, in the 
empirical part of this thesis, I am linking this to what practitioners who are working on 
the field have said and which problems they have brought out. 
Bauer (1974: 16) calls aid axiomatic: the tendency is that everything can be explained 
with „progress“ - „progress is evidence of success, and lack of progress is evidence that 
more must be done; it is usually assumed that giving more aid means doing better, that 
more aid is more meritorious.“ “Don’t go to the pub tonight. Please stay in and give us 
the money. There are people dying now! So, give me the money!” (Youtube, 2007). This 
is how Bob Geldof called on people to donate money for Live Aid in 1985. Though Live 
Aid was organised to relieve the suffering caused by Ethiopian famine, the approach of 
“we are doing good by giving them money” also describes development aid. This is a 
                                                          
10 The Guardian has a series of stories called „The Secret Aid Worker“ where people working in 
development sector are sharing their stories anonymously because of the sensitivity of the topic. 
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false understanding because resources alone do not guarantee the success, and more 
money alone does not mean development. Development needs certain conditions and if 
required conditions are unmet, then aid would be everything else than productive and 
effective. About the necessity of certain conditions, Bauer has also said that “what holds 
back many poor countries is the people who live there, including their governments. A 
society which cannot develop without external gifts is altogether unlikely to do so with 
them” (Bauer, 1974: 17.). Easterly and Pfutze (2008: 30) have studied the best and worst 
practices in foreign aid and their findings also shed some light on the fact that doing more 
and providing more aid does not mean better results for development: “Aid agencies are 
typically not transparent about their operating costs and about how they spend the aid 
money… and aid practices like money going to corrupt autocrats and aid spent through 
ineffective channels like tied aid, food aid, and technical assistance also continue to be a 
problem despite decades of criticism. Riddell (2009: 55) supports this by saying: “There 
are definitely cases of failure, and in aggregate, they involve significant sums of money, 
almost certainly amounting to many hundreds of millions of dollars a year. Likewise, 
there are cases… of project money and resources “going astray”, being channelled into 
uses other than those intended, including people’s pockets.” 
Moyo (2009 as cited in Bhagwati, 2010) argues in her book „Dead Aid“, using the 
example of Africa, how foreign aid instead of progression, has made recipient countries 
to regress. She claims that foreign aid has become an industry where there are too many 
vested interests (Youtube, 2009) and the reason how aid has made recipient countries 
regress is the creation of a culture of dependency – officials who are elected to do their 
job are not taking any steps to change the status quo but instead, they are waiting for new 
money and assistance from donors. This is explained by the dependency theory which 
gained its popularity in the 1970s mostly in South America, and which states that 
economic development of one country is the result of development and growth of another 
country (Berg et al., 2018: 337). The problem here is that foreign aid (together with 
foreign capital) is filling the gap that today’s donor countries themselves once created, 
and this allows them controlling more other state’s economy (Ibid.).  
To conclude with, aid cannot be taken unquestionably because it diminishes the 
possibility for it to improve. Pumping in resources for the sake of giving more is far from 
being effective, and instead of considering it axiomatic, it is necessary to ask more 
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questions and keep the discussion over aid ongoing. In order to overcome the dependence, 
Turhan (2018: 270) argues, there has to be a qualitative change of dependent country’s 
microstructures and foreign affairs. As far as there is no such change, regression will not 
stop, and foreign aid continues working for everyone but not for those it was meant to 
help, as Easterly (2002) puts it. 
1.2. Aid effectiveness  
We could use “effectiveness” to see if foreign aid works but unfortunately, this term is 
too abstract, and thus complicated to measure. BusinessDictionary (no date) explains 
“effectiveness” as following: “The degree to which objectives are achieved and the extent 
to which targeted problems are solved. In contrast to efficiency, effectiveness is 
determined without the reference to costs and, whereas efficiency means “doing the thing 
right,” effectiveness means “doing the right thing.” Many authors have studied if foreign 
aid works or not (see Radelet, 2017; Edwards, 2014; Riddell, 2007 etc). On the other 
hand, there is not a clear understanding of how to make sure if it works or not. This sub-
chapter is built up on theoretical literature on aid effectiveness  
Economic growth could be one way how to measure the effectiveness of development 
aid. In practice, though, it is more complicated because there are different economies 
where people can live. For example, an economy where living is made by herding and 
exchanging goods versus the one which stands on technology and big transnational 
corporations (Black, 2007: 52-53). It does not take much to understand that the same aid 
intervention cannot be beneficial for both sides. In development aid it is called “invisible 
economy” – people who have never had land, whose economic status is often unknown 
and whose life can be seriously affected when something for the sake of economic growth 
and development (dams or factories) is built on the lands they used to live and plant crops. 
Also, people living in these so-called “grey zones” are not benefiting from the 
development aid – money can be in circulation, but social services, for example, are not 
applied to them (Interview with Villsaar, 18.02.2019). On the one hand, it is a challenge, 
but on the other hand, it provides more opportunities – speaking about Africa, then people 
are struggling with getting ID-s and birth certificates (when asked hypothetically, then 
why should a poor African farmer spend 2-3 days to get to the city to register the birth of 
his/her newborn baby), but at the same time, while a lot of people are having mobile 
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phones and access to Internet, it means that the aid effectiveness could be improved if all 
the technological means are being used for the sake of development (Ibid.). 
Studying economic growth as a measurement for aid effectiveness is as old as providing 
development aid itself, and several scholars have studied this issue (see Mallik, 2008; 
Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Skarbek and Leeson, 2009). Mallik (2008), for example, 
studied the impact of aid to the poorest African countries; his study was motivated by the 
sad truth that after 35 years of assistance and over one trillion dollars spent on aid there 
are still plethora of countries in poverty. Results of his study showed that when it comes 
to the poorest Sub-Saharan African countries, then there is no significant effect on foreign 
aid to economic growth (Ibid., 259). He argued that reasons for that could have been low 
level of human capital, weak institutions, volatility of aid flows or lack of fiscal discipline. 
Burnside and Dollar (2000: 847) found that good policies are the most important for 
growth: “Aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, 
monetary, and trade policies but has little effect on the presence of poor policies.” Totally 
different perspective is offered by Skarbek and Leeson (2009) who sought an answer to 
the question whether aid works and what can it do. They argued that both – aid proponents 
and opponents – are right about aid being effective or not but it all depends on what is 
under consideration. As soon as it comes to economic growth, aid has failed because it 
does not offer “a solution to the economic problem of how to allocate resources in ways 
that maximise their value” which economic growth requires (Ibid., 396). 
It appears from the previous paragraph that economic growth rather does not help us here. 
Skarbek and Leeson (Ibid., 394) also stated that “aid is more effective when it is aimed at 
a singular, predetermined end, such as reducing malaria.” I believe this is how we should 
look at development aid – aid should not be provided for the sake of economic growth 
because it is clear that it is not how it works, but for dealing with certain problems, such 
as reducing malaria. To support this argument, number of studies (see Collin and 
Zimmermann, 2007; Gallup and Sachs, 2003) found that malaria can negatively affect the 
economy by creating a “malaria trap”.11 Development aid practitioners also point out that 
economic growth is not the only feature that shows the effectiveness, rather it is important 
                                                          
11 In case of “malaria trap,” malaria causes poverty which, in turn, makes disease prevention unaffordable. 
This can reduce income per capita by half. (Gollin and Zimmermann, 2007: 20) 
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to see human development. This is measured by Human Development Index which gives 
a diverse reflection of country’s state and position in comparison with other countries 
(Berg et al., 2018: 111). In addition, one could take Social Progress Index which is 
somewhat an elaboration to Human Development Index (Ibid., 116). 
When it comes to aid effectiveness, then it is also important how major agreements on 
development are stipulating the effectiveness – Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda. 
Paris Declaration12 (2005: 3) states that for effective aid, partner (recipient) countries 
should be the owners of their own development and donors have to support them in 
holding and exercising the leadership. As said above, this idea was also reflected in 
Millennium Development Goals (Goal Eight). Accra Agenda13 which is a continuation of 
Paris Declaration also states that “countries determine their own development strategies 
by playing a more active role in designing development policies, and take a stronger 
leadership role in co-ordinating aid” (OECD, no date). 
To add more value to “aid effectiveness” then, in my opinion, we should also consider 
Do-No-Harm principle. Being usually used in conflict sensitivity context (CDA 
Collaborative Learning Projects, no date), Do-No-Harm principle fits well also to 
development aid where it means that intervention is done in a way that does not make the 
situation for the recipients worse. For example, aid agency is working on founding a new 
landfill to improve the waste management system but in order to do so, several families 
are forced to abandon their homes because their houses are in the way. It is a principle 
that aid agencies often do not think about – they start intervening (allocating money 
and/or giving technical assistance) without properly thinking how it could affect the 
recipient (whether it is about the local community or the recipient country as a whole). 
Last but not least, effectiveness cannot be taken separately from efficiency. “Killing a fly 
with a nuclear bomb is extremely effective, but is it also efficient?” (Interview with 
Gronvius, 27.03.2019). As money for development projects is coming from tax-payers, it 
is essential to make sure it is not wasted, and it gives the best results possible. 
                                                          
12 Paris Declaration is a practical roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development 
(OECD, no date); 
13 Accra Agenda is a statement endorsed in 2008 which is meant to strenghten the implementation of Paris 
Declaration (OECD, no date). 
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Carefully planned project/programme objectives together with Do-No-Harm principle 
carried out in an efficient way is only part of the equation. Other important part in aid 
effectiveness is strategy which is usually done for several years and which pre-determines 
which aid is provided where. Sweden, for example, has one common strategy for the 
Balkan countries, Moldova, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine for 2014-2020. “Strategy is an 
umbrella, based in which you have very concrete contribution in several areas” (Interview 
with Khudur, 17.12.2018). Estonia’s development aid in Ukraine is guided by Strategy 
for Estonian Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid 2016–2020, additionally 
there is a Country Strategy Paper for each year.14 
1.3. Possible factors 
For the purpose of answering the first research question, I mapped the possible factors 
based on the literature on development aid and strategic documents (strategies and 
reports) meant for public use from the chosen donor countries and their corresponding 
aid organisations. Also, discussions with development cooperation practitioners were 
really helpful in the planning process of this thesis. In the end, I decided to stick to the 
list of seven factors, although in the beginning I had twice as much under consideration 
– 15, to be precise. These were as following: 
Corruption Coordination Lack of trust 
Security Tied aid Timing 
Weak institutions Aid fragmentation Targeting 
Poor governance Bureaucracy History 
Knowledge of local 
condtions 
Sufficient rule of law Resources 
 The reason for decreasing the number was that several factors could be fitted under one 
“umbrella” category – for example, bureaucracy, weak institutions, poor governance and 
sufficient rule of law are all the part of “knowledge of local conditions”. Lack of trust 
could fit under corruption factor. Coordination is something which is part of aid 
fragmentation. Resources suits both tied aid and aid fragmentation, also knowledge of 
local conditions. Also, there were factors which in the end did not seem relevant to 
                                                          
14 The aim here is not to describe completely how strategies for development cooperation are done and 
which country uses what strategy but to support the argument how strategies are related to aid effectiveness. 
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development but rather humanitarian aid and using these for the analysis would have not 
contributed to this research anyhow. I also believe that choosing seven factors instead of 
15 helps me to make an analytical part of this thesis more coherent. Most of the factors 
listed here are very complicated, if at all possible, to measure. 
Knowledge of local conditions  
Knowledge of local conditions is essential for the provision of development aid. Partly, 
these conditions were already explained – corruption and security, but in this context, 
important conditions are also rule of law, state of institutions and governance. Riddell 
(2007: 372) explains governance as following: “Governance is the activities, institutions, 
and processes involved in effectively managing and running a country’s affairs in all its 
different spheres, economic, political and administrative, including the relationships 
between the state and the wider society.” Not knowing local conditions supports the “one-
size-fits-all” approach and in this case the failure is already pre-determined. What fits to 
Georgia, cannot be applied to Ukraine without making any adjustments, and vice versa. 
Tied aid 
Tied aid means that the donor country provides money for aid with a condition to buy 
goods and/or services from the donor country. Report from Commission for Africa (2005 
as cited in Easterly, 2007) concludes well where the problem with tied aid lies: “Rich 
countries pursue their own fixations and fads… They tie aid so that it can only be used to 
buy the donor’s own products or services – effectively reducing the value of aid by as 
much as 30 per cent… They continue to attach unnecessarily detailed conditions to aid 
packages.” Easterly and Pfutze (2008: 45) consider tied aid together with food aid and 
technical assistance the most ineffective ways of providing aid. “Tied aid comes with the 
requirement that a certain percentage of it has to be spent on goods from the donor 
country, which makes the recipient likely to be overcharged since it increases the market 
power of the donor country's firms and often amounts to little more than ill-disguised 
export promotion” (Ibid.). One with the biggest amount of tying aid has been Canada but 
within the last couple of years Canada has done a lot to untie it – when in 2013 it was 
around 7 percent, then couple of years earlier it was 21% (OECD, 2013 as cited in Smillie, 
2016: 93). The measurement for tied aid is the percentage of how much the recipient 
country must use goods or consultants provided by the donor country. Here, I believe, it 
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is important to note that aid cannot be completely untied; otherwise the aid is accepted 
and used by people who were not supposed to use it and for purposes it was not meant to 
be used. Tied aid can be measured when studying the regulatory barriers that development 
agency has set to its requirements. Total level of tied aid is impossible to measure because 
the reporting from donors is often unclear or incomplete (Easterly, 2007: 642). 
Aid fragmentation 
Aid fragmentation occurs when aid is provided by too many sources and spread over too 
many programmes (Deutscher, 2009: 36). Van Lieshout et al. (2010: 114) argue how 
expensive aid fragmentation is and how complicated does it make for recipient 
governments to develop consistent policies because everybody – NGOs, bilateral donors, 
international organisations – have different wishes and requirements. The result of aid 
fragmentation is that everybody seems to get something but, in the end, no one gets 
anything. The Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005: 17) states that “the 
effectiveness of aid is reduced when there are too many duplicating initiatives, especially 
at country and sector levels.” On the other hand, Dreher et al. (2018) argue that, whether 
aid fragmentation is harmful or beneficial for the recipient country, is all context-specific, 
and the competition between donors does not necessarily mean that it is negative. “It is 
intuitively plausible that a growing number of intervening partners in development 
cooperation raises transaction costs and represents a burden on developing countries’ 
administrative capacities. At the same time, a greater number of donors active in a country 
may bring up more innovative ideas, allow the recipient government to benefit from a 
variety of experiences, and put the recipient government in a more powerful position to 
make its own decisions, thereby enhancing ownership” (Gehring et al., 2017: 321). Aid 
fragmentation is more distinctive in the case of humanitarian aid because a tragic event, 
whether it is man-made or natural, occurs rapidly and there are much more people who 
feel the urge to intervene in order to save as many lives as possible. For measuring aid 
fragmentation, OECD (Deutscher, 2009: 37-38) suggests Country programmable aid 
(CPA) which reflects the amount of aid that can be programmed at partner country level. 
CPA excludes humanitarian aid, administrative costs, food aid, core funding of NGOs 
and contributions to Public-Private Partnerships (Ibid.). Easterly (2007: 641) also 
suggests donor fragmentation index (also fractionalization index). 
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Corruption 
Power and money are the ideal hotbed for corruption. There is no clear understanding of 
how much aid is stolen. Senator Paul Rand stated that 70% of all aid gets stolen but, this 
percentage is actually much lower (Kenny, 2017). On the other (and problematic) side, 
the real share of aid getting stolen remains unclear (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008: 32-33). As 
controversial as it seems, the issue of corruption in development aid can be also seen from 
the positive side because it pressurises donors to demonstrate better where and how the 
aid is spent, thus making it more transparent and donors more accountable (David-Barrett, 
2017: 1). Like in aid fragmentation, corruption often occurs in humanitarian aid, 
especially when it comes to such aid that is brought to country and has to be transported 
over the border; in order to speed up the process, border officials may start hinting that 
there is a faster way to get things done. This was one of the challenges that Eero Janson 
(Interview, 23.03.2018), the director of Estonian Refugee Council brought out. 
Measuring corruption itself is complicated, not to mention measuring corruption in 
development aid. The problem here is that the perception of corruption is different - illicit 
action for one person may be completely normal for another. For measuring corruption, 
the Corruption Perceptions Index which Transparency International publishes annually, 
can be used.  
Security 
The biggest challenge that security represents for development cooperation is uncertainty 
because whenever the level of security decreases, aid projects can be abandoned for 
uncertain period of time. Security plays a bigger role in humanitarian aid because food or 
medical aid is provided already on the course of emergency, and development projects, 
if at all, are starting to take place when security situation improves. Security in 
development cooperation becomes an important matter when something happens/changes 
rapidly, for example, incident between Russian and Ukrainian ships and soldiers on the 
Azov Sea in November 2018. After that no one knew what could happen next and how 
would the Martial Law affect the cooperation between donor organisations and recipient 
country institutions. Security is not only about armed conflict; it can also be related to 
country’s internal politics – high level of corruption and poor governance make an ideal 
hotbed for protests, and again, no one could foresee how serious it could go. When it 
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comes to Ukraine, then the level of security is especially low in the eastern part of the 
country (Donbas) because of the ongoing war with Russia. Nevertheless, development 
agencies are actively working all around Ukraine, and seemingly without security-related 
problems15. 
Targeting and timing 
First of all, aid is not allocated only to those who are in need, but the allocation is shaped 
and influenced a lot by the donors’ interests, whether these are strategic, political or 
commercial. Riddell (2007: 358) argues that if aid was only allocated to those in need, 
three times more people could be saved from poverty. He (Ibid., 370) develops this 
thought by arguing that aid works best when provided to those who are strongly 
committed and capable of using it well. 
Secondly, timing – when is it the most beneficial to start intervening? Wrong timing could 
obstruct the whole implementation process which, in the worst-case scenario, means that 
a lot of money is wasted by achieving nothing. Another side is that when the project is 
implemented, then results are rarely noticed immediately. That is what makes 
development projects so time-consuming. Lastly, question of coordination. Target and 
timing can be measured while developing the intervention and later in the process of 
monitoring and evaluation. To the best of my knowledge, there is no model nor formula 
for measuring the targeting and timing in development cooperation, but it can be done 
with setting the right indicators and targets, and knowing well the local conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Number of journalists have written about the „forgotten war“ in Ukraine, which means that everywhere 
else but in Donbas or near the actual control line one could not tell that Ukraine is a country at war which 
has killed over 10 000 people already. 
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2. Research design and methodology 
In the broadest sense, this thesis is between the single case and comparative study. The 
focus is on the single case – development aid in Ukraine – but mapping the factors with 
the help of chosen donors is what adds the comparative dimension to it. Landman (2008: 
86) calls it a single-country study which is “any study in which a single country forms the 
basic unit of analysis, but which may also be broken down into smaller units across time 
and space, by examining sub-national variation across states in federal countries, other 
administrative units in unitary systems, as well as other appropriate units of analysis, such 
as individuals.” When it comes to single-country study, then “it is possible to focus on 
the particular features of a country while at the same time relating those features to 
broader sets of research questions in the field of comparative politics” (Ibid.).  
2.1. Case selection 
This research focuses on a single country – Ukraine. Ukraine was chosen for a number of 
reasons. First and foremost, Ukraine is often “in the picture” because of the ongoing war 
and the need for both humanitarian and development aid. The latter skyrocketed in 
November 201316 and since then Ukraine has been a huge arena for multiple donors. In 
addition to single country, this study focuses on four development aid donors which are 
the following:  
• Germany (GIZ) 
• Sweden (SIDA) 
• Switzerland (The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation) 
• Estonia (Estonian Development Cooperation) 
Germany and Sweden are among the biggest donor countries to Ukraine (Ukrinform, 
2018). Switzerland, together with Germany and Sweden (also other Nordic countries) has 
contributed to providing the successful technical assistance projects for institution-
building in Ukraine and they have developed a number of good practices (Wolczuk and 
Žeruolis, 2018: 23-24). Switzerland is also an interesting case because it was chairing the 
                                                          
16 When President Yanukovich refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EE, it was shocking 
both for the EU and many Western donors, and they understood it is time to step up and help Ukraine 
(Interview with Disler, 03.01.2019). 
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OSCE in 2014 during the most critical time in Ukraine, and they have always had an 
important role in conflict management in Ukraine. Estonia, on the other hand, is a small 
donor but it has a similar experience to Ukraine (both belonged to the Soviet Union and 
both regained their independence at the same time) and Estonian Development 
Cooperation works differently than, for example, GIZ. I believe this could add value to 
the comparison dimension of this thesis. 
2.2. Interviews 
For the purpose of answering the second research question, I carried out interviews with 
people from the same donor countries working in Ukraine or related to development 
projects there. Altogether, I conducted 14 interviews17 with 10 participants – out of which 
eight were in person and six via Skype – with open-ended questions. In my opinion, the 
latter was the only option for these interviews because open-ended questions do not set 
limits to answers and it allows to ask additional and/or explaining questions, if necessary. 
To improve the analytical part of this thesis, I conducted the follow-up interviews with 
some of the participants (unfortunately, not all of them were available for the second 
interview). For the sake of clarity, I have to mention that two interviews (with NGO 
Mondo and Estonian Refugee Council) were conducted in Spring 2018 with the focus on 
humanitarian not development aid, but both of these interviews gave me the 
understanding that the line between two types of foreign aid is very blurry and in the end, 
these interviews handled both topics – humanitarian aid and development aid. Thus, I am 
taking the freedom to use the parts from these interviews related to development aid in 
the analytical part of this thesis. 
Interview questions are divided into three separate blocks – development aid in general, 
Ukraine, and retrospect and future vision. First block helped me to get to know better the 
organisation (and donor country) the interviewee represents; in addition, it contributes to 
the theoretical framework. Second block was about Ukraine and there we mostly 
discussed the possible factors affecting the provision of development aid. Last block is a 
kind of a retrospect to the aid provided so far. 
                                                          
17 All the interviews are conducted and transcribed by the author of this thesis. 
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Below is the list of interviewees together with their organisation and position, and 
questions for interviews: 
1) Janson, E. (2018) Interview, director of Estonian Refugee Council. Skype, 
23.03.2018; 
2) Svištš, V. (2018) Interview, expert of humanitarian aid at NGO Mondo. Kyiv, 
11.04.2018; 
3) Gordiienko, O. (2018) Interview, adviser at GIZ. Tallinn, 09.12.2018; follow-up 
interview took place in Kyiv, 17.04.2019; 
4) Khudur, K. (2018) Interview, Director of U-LEAD (SIDA). Skype, 17.12.2018; 
5) Zhuravel, T. (2018) Interview, Project Director at GIZ. Skype, 27.12.2018; 
follow-up interview took place in Kyiv, 16.04.2019; 
6) Disler, C. (2019) Interview, Senior adviser at SDC. Skype, 03.01.2019; follow up 
interview took place in Kyiv, 11.03.2019; 
7) Brömling, G. (2019) Interview, Project Director at GIZ. Skype, 04.01.2019; 
8) Gronvius, D. (2019) Interview, First Secretary of Reform Cooperation at SIDA. 
Skype, 04.01.2019; follow-up interview took place in Kyiv, 27.03.2019; 
9) Villsaar, K. O. (2019), Interview, Policy Officer at Estonian Roundtable for 
Development Cooperation. Tallinn, 18.02.2019; 
10) Ennok, H. (2019) Interview, First Secretary (Economic Affairs, Development 
Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid) at the Embassy of Estonia in Kyiv, 
08.05.2019. 
In addition, I had a number of discussions/consultations which do not qualify as 
interviews, but which helped me understand the context and which I find very beneficial 
for the thesis: 
1) Marju Tooding from Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2) Anatoli Ljutjuk from Ukrainian Cultural Centre in Tallinn 
3) David Brennan from U-LEAD with Europe Programme (GIZ) in Kyiv 
4) Roland Hackenberg from U-LEAD with Europe Programme (GIZ) in Kyiv 
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Below are the open-ended questions for interviews: 
I block - development aid in general 
1) Introduction of your organisation; 
2) What do you consider an effective development aid? 
3) What are the biggest problems in the provision of development aid? 
4) What are the most important factors one needs to think about before planning and 
implementing (development aid) intervention? 
II block – Ukraine 
1) If and how does Ukraine differ from other aid recipient (post-Soviet) countries? 
2) What are the most important factors one needs to think about before planning and 
implementing (development aid) intervention in Ukraine? 
3) When it comes to Ukraine, then how do the following factors affect the provision 
of aid: 
a. Tied aid 
b. Aid fragmentation 
c. Security 
d. Corruption 
e. Timing 
f. Targeting 
g. Knowledge of local conditions 
III block – retrospect and future vision 
1) Can you see that things are changing for better? 
2) Has the aid been effective? Is there a room for improvement? 
3) Are there any big changes that need to be undertaken? 
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2.3. Possible limitations 
There are several possible limitations I could think of. Firstly, one could not generalise, 
e.g. apply the results of this research to other aid recipient countries. Although 
generalisation is not the aim per se, I believe it would still be possible but only to a certain 
extent, and it also depends on the recipient country. For example, one could draw a 
parallel between Ukraine and neighbouring Belarus and Moldova, in a lesser extent also 
between Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. When it comes to aid recipient countries 
in Asia or Africa, then it would be more complicated. 
Secondly, this thesis will not allow to make fundamental conclusions about aid 
effectiveness. This is a descriptive research which seeks to give a quick overview of what 
needs to be considered before we could actually talk about aid effectiveness. I believe 
that aid effectiveness as a separate research topic takes much more than one master thesis 
– it takes years of working experience in the mentioned field and knowing the topic more 
thoroughly.  
Thirdly, theoretical part is focusing too much on Africa. Reason for this is that Africa 
with its development, in comparison to other continents, is unquestionably the most 
researched. There is a separate chapter in this thesis which aims to give an overview of 
Ukraine and foreign aid provided to it, and one of the aims of this chapter is to decrease 
the focus on Africa and reset it to Ukraine. 
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3. Country overview – recipient and the donors 
3.1. Ukraine – recipient 
Ukraine is the second biggest country in Europe by territory. According to United Nations 
report „World Economic Situation Prospects“, Ukraine is considered an economy in 
transition (2018: 141) which, figuratively said, means being between developing and 
developed. Transitional economy is economy which „is in the process of changing from 
a centrally planned economy to a free market (Encyclopedia.com, no date). Transition to 
free market takes usually around ten years but for Ukraine, this process has been slower. 
Having an ongoing war with Russia, high level of corruption and unstable political 
situation do not make it any easier nor faster. Ukraine has a lot to gain from development 
aid, therefore it is essential to know Ukraine’s background a bit more. Thus, the aim of 
this chapter is to give readers a brief overview of how Ukraine has reached to the point it 
is now. 
In 1991, when Soviet Union collapsed, all post-Soviet states (and not only) were behind 
the same starting line but not all have been doing equally good. 
GDP per capita in Poland and Ukraine, international dollars* using purchasing power parity rates 
(Source: Worldbank as cited in Gordiienko 2016) 
Åslund (1995: 126) writes: “As a newly liberated nation that had been largely under 
Russian hegemony for more than three centuries, Ukraine was preoccupied with its 
national security and its identity. Democratization and economics became secondary 
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concerns.” This together with a lack of political will and leadership (which perfectly 
described country’s first president Leonid Kravchuk) started to push Ukraine towards 
hard times. Developing Ukraine was not the most pressing question for the West. “In 
Ukraine as a post-Soviet core-state with close historical, social, economic and cultural 
ties to Russia, an intrusion of Western institutions into Russia’s Cordon Sanitaire was 
absolutely inconceivable” (GIZ, 2018: 15). Despite being one of the biggest US aid 
recipient and seeming to have found the way how to successfully balance between Russia 
and the West, crony capitalism together with rampant corruption and political instability 
described Ukraine the best in the beginning of 2000s (Yekelchyk, 2015: 78). 
The first years of 2000s are also known for Kuchmagate18, creating of large democratic 
coalition called “Ukraine without Kuchma”, parliamentary elections in 2002 and high-
scale fraud in presidential elections in 2004 (Ibid., 89). The latter acted as a catalyst that 
started the protests in Maidan, known as the Orange Revolution. The number of 
challenges Ukraine was facing did not decrease after the Orange Revolution – freshly-
elected president Yuschchenko had to fight with Kuchma’s corrupt and criminal legacy, 
bridge the division between eastern-southern and western-central regions of Ukraine, deal 
with the officials participating in the election fraud, reform the media and resolve the 
rising budget deficit (Karatnycky, 2005). Above all, Yuschchenko had to find a way for 
pragmatic relationship with Russia. Russia, on the contrary, carried a huge loss due to 
Yuschchenko’s success in the election and instead of a pragmatic relationship, it 
responded to Ukraine with the rapid increase of a gas price – at first from $50 to $230, 
which after the negotiations became $95 (Yekelchyk, 2015: 96). For Ukraine’s economy 
it still had a catastrophic result. The time in Ukraine between two revolutions – the Orange 
Revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2013 was full of political fighting, 
instability and uncertainty. “Corruption and cronyism were supposed to give way to 
transparency and democracy. "Bandits" were meant to be jailed, dubious privatisations 
were meant to be reversed. EU and NATO membership appeared to be within reach” 
                                                          
18 In 2001, tapes where Kuchma allegedly confessed ordering the murder of government-critic journalist 
Georgy Gongadze were revealed. Number of political experts predicted that revealing of these tapes marked 
the end of Kuchma’s political career, and that Kuchmagate was also “a key moment in the evolution of 
Ukrainian institutions” (Åslund and Lieven 2001). 
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(Mulvey, 2006). Today it does not look anything like that; the same problems have 
maintained. 
Another important chapter for Ukraine started in November 2013 when then-president 
Viktor Yanukovych decided to abandon the Association Agreement with the European 
Union and opt for having closer ties with Russia. Association Agreement was already 
under discussion in 2006; it was initialled in March 2012 (Gardner, 2014). Yanukovych’s 
decision not to sign the agreement had very serious and long-standing results. It was a 
catalyst to a series of events - large-scale protests in Kyiv, more known as Euromaidan 
or “Revolution of Dignity” which resulted in removing Yanukovych from power couple 
of months later; political agitation in Crimea and Eastern-Ukraine and the annexation of 
Crimea by Russia in March 2014 – which resulted in a military conflict between Russia-
supported separatists and Ukraine’s National Army. Ukraine found itself in a deadlock, 
both politically and crisis-wise. Conflict that diplomats call “inactive” and soldiers 
fighting for Ukraine “like a slowly moving tripper” (Piirsalu, 2018) does not show any 
signs of solution. International Crisis Group’s report “Ukraine: Running out of Time” 
(2014: 16) concludes that the crisis in Ukraine is the result of years long mismanagement 
and high level of corruption. Management in Ukraine has not gotten much better – in 
2016, the same NGO called President Poroshenko a “master of procrastination” 
(International Crisis Group, 2016: 7; see also Kyiv Post, 16 March 2018) because he has 
not done much for fighting with corruption (rather obstructing it). 
3.2. Germany (GIZ) – donor 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) is a German 
development agency founded in 2011 after the merger of three German development 
organisations – DED, GTZ and InWEnt. Together with these three organisations, GIZ has 
over 50 years of experience in a number of areas from economic development to energy, 
from peace to security (GIZ Profile, no date). GIZ is cooperating with businesses, NGOs 
and research centres in over 120 countries and its main commissioning partner is the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (Ibid.). 
GIZ has been active in Ukraine since 1993 (GIZ Worldwide, no date). GIZ is working on 
behalf of five Federal Ministries of Germany, also for the European Union, the UK AID 
and the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. Currently, good governance, energy 
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efficiency and sustainable economic development are on the focus of GIZ actions in 
Ukraine (GIZ in Ukraine, no date). Success stories that GIZ has in Ukraine are 
encompassing building and supporting the PROZORRO online procurement system 
which has helped the Ukrainian Government to save over 1.6 million euros; the campaign 
“Don’t give AIDS a Chance!” which has reached 39% of Ukrainians, and U-LEAD with 
Europe Programme which aims to strengthen the amalgamated communities by giving 
them more resources and responsibilities (Ibid.). 
3.3. Sweden (SIDA) – donor 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) is a government 
organisation which has two main aims - reducing poverty in the world and reform 
cooperation in Eastern Europe. SIDA is operating with about a half of the Swedish aid 
budget which is about one percent of Swedish GDP (About Swedish development 
cooperation 2017, no date). SIDA is active in 35 countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and 
Latin America and in Ukraine SIDA has been working since 1995 (Our work in Ukraine, 
2015). Sectors where SIDA is active in Ukraine are the following: market development, 
democracy, human rights, decentralisation and energy efficiency; in addition to 
development aid, SIDA is also providing humanitarian aid due to the conflict in eastern 
Ukraine (Ibid.). SIDA’s work in Ukraine is shaped by the “Results strategy for Sweden’s 
reform cooperation in Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and Turkey.” In 2018, SIDA 
has provided Ukraine USD 19.9 million worth of aid19 ((Openaid.se, no date). 
3.4. Switzerland (SDC) – donor 
Switzerland started providing foreign aid after the end of World War II when Swiss 
Donation was founded. Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation was created in 
1996 after the renaming of Directorate of Development and Technical Cooperation and 
Humanitarian Aid for Central and Eastern Europe. The latter suggests that SDC is 
operating only in Central and Eastern Europe, but SDC is active in many countries on 
four continents (most of the countries are in Africa). (Portrait: SDC in brief, no date)  
In Ukraine, Switzerland is implementing its development project through three actors – 
in addition to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), there are also 
                                                          
19 Among this is USD 4.9 million of emergency aid which is not relevant for the purpose of this work. 
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Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) and the Human Security Division 
(HSD) within the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Swiss cooperation 
strategy for Ukraine, 2015-2018: 8). As SDC is the Swiss Government’s centre of 
competence for international cooperation, I am only focusing on that. Swiss contribution 
to Ukraine’s development is guided by the Swiss cooperation strategy for Ukraine 2015-
2018 which takes into account all the challenges Ukraine is facing. There are four key 
sectors Switzerland is focusing on: decentralisation, health, energy and economic 
development (Swiss cooperation strategy for Ukraine, 2015-2018: 8). During the 
cooperation period 2011-2014, Switzerland successfully supported Ukraine’s local 
governance and public services, reproductive health, sustainable energy management and 
financial and economic sustainability (Ibid., 14-16). For 2015-2018 the goal for 
Switzerland was “to promote cohesion, inclusive democratic governance and sustainable 
socio-economic development in Ukraine aiming at a peaceful, equitable and prosperous 
society” (Ibid., 19). In order to implement the projects stated in the cooperation strategy, 
the budget for the period 2015-2018 amounted to CHF 99 million20 which is over 70% 
more than the budget for period 2011-2014 (CHF 57 million21) (Ibid., 23). Among the 
completed projects in Ukraine are Development of Citizenship Competences, E-
Governance for Accountability and Participation and Decentralisation in Ukraine 
(Switzerland’s activities in Ukraine, no date). 
3.5. Estonia (Estonian Development Cooperation) – donor 
Estonia does not have its major aid agency but nevertheless, Estonia has systematically 
contributed to development aid since 1998 (Principles of Estonian development 
cooperation, 2003) Together with development and humanitarian aid, Estonia’s 
contribution has increased 100 times within 20 years – when in 1998 Estonia allocated 
0.39 million euros, then in 2017 it was already 38.2 million euros (Kressa, 2018). 
According to Strategy of Estonian Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid 
2016-2020 (no date: 11-12), priority countries for Estonia are Afghanistan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Among others, goals for Estonian development 
cooperation are supporting the quality of education and development of healthcare, 
                                                          
20 EUR 87.4 million 
21 EUR 50.3 million 
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contributing to the development of democracy and guaranteeing human rights, and 
promoting economic development (Strategy of Estonian Development Cooperation and 
Humanitarian Aid 2016-2020, no date: 4-5).  
Ukraine has been a priority country for Estonian Development Cooperation since 2006, 
and it was the first country to get aid when Estonia started providing it (Principles of 
Development Cooperation between Estonia and Ukraine 2017-2018, no date: 2). 
Throughout these years, Estonia has contributed a lot to education, e-governance and 
training of Ukrainian officials (Ibid.). As noted before, the need for foreign aid in Ukraine 
boosted in 2014, thus Estonian aid to Ukraine within the last couple of years has also 
increased rapidly – money allocated for development cooperation in 2014 was 0.68 
million euros, but in 2017 it was already 1.5 million euros (Ibid., 3). Some examples of 
recent development projects in Ukraine are strengthening good governance and 
democratic processes with Estonian Centre of Eastern Partnership, organising IT-courses 
and hackathons with Garage48 Foundation, capacity building of the Diplomatic Academy 
of Ukraine with Estonian School of Diplomacy and supporting educational reforms in 
Ukraine with Foundation Innove (Estonia’s Support for Ukraine in Facts and Figures, no 
date). In addition, Estonia is contributing to the biggest development project in Ukraine 
– U-LEAD with Europe Programme – which is implemented by GIZ (amalgamating 
hromadas22) and SIDA (developing administrative centres). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Hromada – small local community. The idea behind amalgamation is to make these communities bigger 
and stronger by giving them more responsibilities and resources. 
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4. Analysis 
In the theoretical part of this thesis, I opened the topic of development aid and argued 
how is aid effectiveness viewed by different authors. I also mapped the possible factors 
affecting the provision of effective development aid which was to answer my first 
research question posed in the introduction. Previous chapter was about the countries 
which are on the focus of this work – Ukraine, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Estonia. The purpose of all this was setting the ground for answering the second research 
question which was also posed in the introduction: How could these factors be applied to 
Ukrainian context? Below is the analysis of these factors in Ukrainian context which is 
based on the interviews with practitioners working on the field. Before moving on to the 
factors I am analysing the problems in development aid through the eyes of practitioners. 
I find it important to know because I believe that taking the factors into consideration 
while planning and implementing an aid intervention could help us solve the problems 
which practitioners had brought out. Analysing factors is followed by discussion based 
on the last block of interview questions, where I am trying to discuss if aid has been 
changing things for better for Ukraine and are there any big changes that need to be 
undertaken in the provision of development aid. 
Ukraine is not just another developing country which has been aided for decades with any 
positive results. There are many features that make Ukraine unique. It does not make 
sense to compare Ukraine with African or Asian but with similar – post-Soviet countries. 
To start with, Ukraine is a large country with huge population. “That is actually a 
significant concern because one has to be selective whether to take a regional (certain 
areas) or the whole country approach (Interview with Gronvius, 27.03.2019). Ukraine’s 
size – both territory and population - makes development cooperation definitely more 
challenging when already in Kyiv there is more people than in Moldova or Georgia.23 
Brömling (Interview, 04.01.2019) also noted Ukraine’s size: “If I compare Ukraine with 
the Balkans… they say “we implemented a big nationwide energy management 
monitoring system”… but when we then see the numbers, they only have couple of 
hundreds of buildings.” Another thing that should be taken into account is an ongoing 
                                                          
23 Data on the population of Kyiv is inadequate because there has not been an official census for a long 
time. It is estimated to be up to four million people. 
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armed conflict. There are other conflicted regions – South Caucasus and Transnistria – 
but what makes Ukraine different is that the conflict is active, not frozen as in other 
countries. Last but not least, Ukraine has a clear intention to join both EU and NATO. 
“This is not only about the membership, but we are talking about European standards, 
principles of good governance… This is a very clear geopolitical direction” (Interview 
with Zhuravel, 27.12.2018). 
4.1. Problems in development aid 
Above, in the theoretical part, I wrote how several authors (Bauer; Easterly; Easterly and 
Pfutze; Riddell) have argued against development aid. Three main sources of criticism 
were as following: aid being axiomatic, money and regress. In this sub-chapter, I am 
writing about the problems in development aid that have been brought out by the 
practitioners working on the field. Question about problems belonged to my interview 
questionnaire because I believe that discussing this question helps to shed some light to 
the possible factors affecting the provision of effective development aid. 
To start with, the biggest problem in development aid is if it works or not – does it bring 
any changes; does the aid even reach the beneficiary? Helen Ennok (Interview, 
08.05.2019) from Estonian Embassy in Kyiv used Afghanistan as an example – aid has 
provided there for decades, but nothing has changed for better, as if money has been going 
to the black hole. To make it worse, many of the countries that are aided do not have 
democratic regimes. This, in turn, poses a justified question – why should such countries 
be aided at all? Christian Disler (Interview, 11.03.2019) from The Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation argued that such countries have to be helped because if a 
country is about to collapse because of lack of support, then no one can predict what it 
could result with in the long run: “We work with what we have, and we try to make this 
better.” Taras Zhuravel (Interview, 16.04.2019) from GIZ adds the changes on political 
level – in order to have activities really implemented, donor organisations have to 
continue with everything they have planned despite of changes on political level. For the 
donor, perhaps not from the donor’s perspective itself, it is always better to stay in the 
recipient country for longer. Pulling out from the country is the easiest solution but as 
development aid is focusing on systematic changes, then it takes a lot of time and patience 
to see if aid has been useful or not. One solution to the problem of aid being useful and 
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effective is raising awareness. Karl Oskar Villsaar (Interview, 18.02.2019) from Estonian 
Roundtable for Development Cooperation said that people should understand more about 
global education; that providing aid is not “burning money” but it is meant to solve the 
problems the world is full of. He added that the political will to increase the aid budget 
clearly depends on how people understand development aid (Ibid.). If citizens do not 
support providing aid, then it could affect the aid budget negatively which, in turn, can 
affect donor’ possibilities to contribute long-term. Long-term projects, on the other hand, 
are key to the systematic changes.  
Secondly, all interviewees brought out financing as one of the problems in development 
aid, though different countries see money problem from a different point of view. When 
it comes to Estonia, then both Ennok (Interview, 08.05.2019) and Villsaar (Interview, 
18.02.2019) said that Estonia’s main issue is limited development aid budget, and this 
can hinder the continuation of one or another project. As an example, Ennok (Interview, 
08.05.2019) used export promotion program „Export Revolution“ in Ukraine which is 
done in cooperation with Estonian Marketing Institute. The problem here is that due to 
limited budget this program cannot continue, although there is a clear need for it and it 
has been highly successful. What came to me as a surprise, then Swedish side also raised 
money question as a problem, although there it is contrary – there is a certain budget and 
money has to be spent, otherwise there is a possibility that aid budget is reduced next 
year. There is an inherent conflict in a way development aid is done - on the one hand, 
projects have to be done to get the funding, but on the other hand, all the money has to be 
spent, even though your partner (recipient) is not delivering, and one can see that the 
money is going to be wasted (Interview with Gronvius, 27.03.2019). The problem is that 
development cooperation is about certain standards which, in its essence, should 
contribute to development, but the inherent conflict what Daniel Gronvius from SIDA 
brought out, refers that the possibility of “money going bad” is by default a part of 
development cooperation. Disler (Interview, 11.03.2019) also mentioned money problem 
– there is a constant risk that money is being misused. This requires risk mitigation – good 
monitoring and choosing the partners right – which all aid donors are having. From the 
interviews it also came out that risk mitigation has to work both ways because there have 
been cases when aid is not misused by the recipient but by the donor (precisely, donor 
chosen project implementer). 
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Lastly, the idea of development aid being regressing was also reflected from the 
interviews. Ennok (Interview, 08.05.2019) said that in cases where aid is not targeted, 
and it is just a financial allocation to the state budget, it is almost impossible to control 
where the aid ends up in. This is a dangerous approach which does not contribute to 
development, on the contrary, it increases the dependency from aid. This problem was 
also brought out by Disler (Interview, 11.03.2019) who said that by providing aid you 
can do more harm than good, which makes it necessary to always measure the impact you 
may have for the recipient: “Sometimes you can give wrong incentives without even 
noticing it yourself.” Indirectly is this problem related to the aspect Gronvius (Interview, 
27.03.2019) pointed out: “In development aid, you do not have, as an implementer or 
funding agency, live with the consequences of your programming.” If donor does more 
harm than good which implementing its project/programme, then it is the recipient who 
has to live with it afterwards. In order to fix the harm that was done, recipient is in a need 
of more aid. This, as a result, can lead to the dependency on aid which is not what 
development aid is about. 
4.2. Analysis of factors 
Knowledge of local conditions 
To begin with, knowledge of local conditions should be taken as a starting point because 
what Ukraine is today and how it has developed since the collapse of Soviet Union is 
what makes it unique as much as challenging for the donors. Ukraine has been strongly 
influenced by the Soviet regime. “No new regime anywhere is ever able to start with a 
clean slate. It is therefore impossible for a new regime or state to completely break with 
its ancien regime (Kuzio, 1998: 7). Soviet legacy was also mentioned by three 
interviewees – one must really consider Ukraine’s political history and its roots from the 
Soviet past (Interview with Gronvius, 04.01.2019). “Sometimes it is really hard to 
understand the dynamics of political economy and local conditions – you still have some 
of the old cards around. The system has been hit, but it is still not dead yet, which means 
that you still have resistance from the actors who are still around, despite all the reforms 
that has been done” (Interview with Disler, 11.03.2019). Ennok (Interview, 08.05.2019) 
did not mean exactly Soviet past but she mentioned that Estonian aid to Ukraine is really 
appreciated due to the common history, understanding each other and also the language 
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(for example, being able to communicate in Russian makes cooperation between donor 
and recipient much easier). 
“The term sistema (the system) refers to opaque ways in which informal networks interact 
with formal hierarchies. Modernisation in Russia cannot succeed as long as this system 
of informal power and governance remains untouched. Russian leaders talk about 
changing Russia from the top down, without however addressing the informal rules and 
constraints that govern their own behaviour and that of political, bureaucratic and 
business elites.” 
Alena Ledeneva (2012: 17) 
This research is still about Ukraine not Russia, and although not completely, I find 
Ledeneva’s “sistema” applicable to Ukraine in a way. Like in Russia, Ukraine’s political 
economy is influenced by the oligarchic system which is a network of mutual connections 
between the businessmen and politicians. Kononczuk (2016) argues how the oligarchy in 
Ukraine works well because of the weak state: “They are the beneficiaries of all the 
shortcomings of Ukraine – systemic corruption, the lack of an independent judiciary, and 
an inefficient administration.” What makes it complicated in Ukraine’s case – Ukraine 
has a semi-presidential system where the president has a substantial amount of power, 
although he still needs to be careful to navigate between competing interests (Jarabik and 
Minakov, 2016). In Ukraine, the most important politician – President Poroshenko – 
stands also behind the “pyramid of rent-seeking” next to the formal institutions. “These 
arrangements are resistant to changes because this has made some people really wealthy 
and powerful. Any reform has to be either approved by them or be done against their 
wishes which is difficult” (Interview with Gronvius, 04.01.2019). Although oligarchic 
system has some advantages – protecting the country’s economic independence; fulfilling 
state’s functions when state itself fails to do so; contributing to political pluralism – it has 
to be said that “the overall influence of Ukrainian big business is harmful and hinders the 
country’s development in both political and economic terms” (Matuszak, 2012: 5; 75-
77). 
From here we can move on to political commitment. There is a certain need for a number 
of areas that need to be developed – energy efficiency, decentralisation, healthcare – and 
Ukraine knows from which country it can get appropriate assistance. From the donor’s 
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perspective it is also important to determine the focus areas that one or another donor 
country is willing and able to develop. Development aid, on the other hand, does not work 
on a principle “we need aid, you provide it, we watch”, but both sides – donor and 
recipient – need to be interested in development. “The most important factor for us in the 
communal sector is getting a commitment from the highest level in the municipality – the 
mayor. If you don’t have the commitment of the mayor, you have very limited 
possibilities to implement a successful project on that spot” (Interview with Brömling, 
04.01.2019). Janson (Interview, 23.03.2018) from Estonian Refugee Council also brought 
out that communication in state institutions is challenging – the higher you go, the more 
difficult it gets. 
Finally, the feature that many interviewees mentioned, and which has an enormous effect 
to development aid – the size and location of the country. “Ukraine is a large country and 
that is actually a significant concern because one has to select whether to take a regional 
or country-level approach which then would not be filtered down to direct recipients so 
easily than in smaller countries, such as Georgia and Moldova” (Interview with Gronvius, 
04.01.2019). Position-wise, both geographically and geopolitically, Ukraine has a 
challenging location - between the East and the West, between Europe and Russia, 
between European values and Soviet legacy. It all matters and has to be considered before 
providing development aid. With humanitarian aid it is easier, as the main aim is 
alleviating human suffering, but development aid is different – it is about fundamental 
and long-term political, economic and societal changes. One can work only with the 
materials that the customer has provided. If this material includes abovementioned 
features, such as oligarchic system, Soviet legacy etc, then in order to make it work and 
provide an effective aid, one has to take them all into consideration.  
Tied aid 
Tied aid is a serious concern for development aid. The idea behind it is bringing the 
benefit to the donor, not recipient country. According to Concord’s AidWatch 2017 
(2017: 58) report which monitors and makes recommendations to improve the quality and 
quantity of development aid among EU countries, the biggest tied aid providers are Czech 
Republic (22.36%) Poland (36.98%) and Slovak Republic (40.28%). For clarification, 
this percentage is taken from the total inflated aid which is the aid that does not contribute 
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to development. None of the biggest aid-tiers is on focus in this thesis. When it comes to 
the donor countries I am using for this research, then according to the same report (Ibid.), 
Estonia has it 0.00%, Germany 1.18% and Sweden 4.59%. As Switzerland is not the 
member of European Union, then there is no such data for Switzerland.  
Tied aid is something about which often even development aid practitioners are not well-
informed, but considering the interviews, then none of the donors had anything to do with 
tied aid nor the problems caused by it. Gronvius (Interview, 27.03.2019), for example, 
said resolutely that Sweden is not dealing with such kind of aid. Disler (Interview, 
11.03.2019) argued how now with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Switzerland has 
chosen more pragmatic approach where it should be thinking more to its national interests 
and its partners should cooperate more in the areas important for Switzerland – migration 
issues, for example – but Ukraine does not play any role here. Ennok (Inteview, 
08.05.2019) argued that tied aid is used as much as it is reasonable and necessary – as this 
is donor country’s experience and expertise that is wanted in the recipient country, then 
it is logical to use your own experts for it. 
What may seem as a tied aid (but which is not) is that each donor has its own focus areas 
where they are active in Ukraine, thus they are only aiding certain areas which, in turn, 
may seem that they benefit themselves from it. The reasoning here is that:  
1) donors are focusing on areas where the knowledge and know-how is the most 
comprehensive – it is especially the case for small donors and small agencies 
because with limited resources it is possible to do limited things, thus it makes 
sense to develop “your own niche areas” (Interview with Janson, 23.03.2018). 
NGO Mondo, for example, is focusing on educational projects and promotion of 
human rights (Interview with Svištš, 11.04.2018); 
2) donors are supporting and aiding the areas where aid could add the most value; it 
is important to avoid what others have done and contribute with what adds the 
most value to the country; 
3) donors are supporting and aiding the pre-determined sectors which are known to 
be essential for Ukraine and where Ukraine has the highest interest – for example, 
SIDA, GIZ and SDC are all working on energy efficiency, market development 
and promotion of good governance. 
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Another argument is closer to the actual tying of aid – all organisations except Estonian 
ones are using international experts instead of local ones. As it was noted before, tied aid 
means also using the experts and consultants from the donor country (or hired by donors). 
But again, the real problem lies somewhere else – Disler (Interview, 03.01.2019) pointed 
out that often there is very low level of local knowledge and lack of professional national 
personnel and that makes flying in the international experts necessary. Villsaar 
(Interview, 18.02.2019) agrees that it is completely normal and understandable when 
donor provides its own experts when it comes to specific areas (education or IT) where 
the expertise in the recipient country is non-existent, but in the end, it is more important 
how locals are in involved in development. When we are speaking about the capacity 
building and the future of public officials, then all the donors are trying their best to work 
with what Ukraine has to offer (Ibid.). For example, U-LEAD with Europe (implemented 
by GIZ and SIDA) is really focusing on capacity building because when the project 
implementation period is over, then it is going to be all “on the shoulders” of national 
personnel to maintain of what has been achieved. Estonian Refugee Council’s opinion 
about tied aid is that when local markets are working then it is not a good practice to 
transport them from Estonia (Interview with Janson, 23.03.2018). Although this goes 
about humanitarian aid, it can also be applied to development context when instead of 
local markets we use local personnel and experts.  
Aid fragmentation 
Aid fragmentation in development aid in Ukraine is definitely a factor that affects the 
provision of effective development aid. This has become more important especially after 
2014 when Ukraine was suddenly „on everyone’s radar“ and the need for aid skyrocketed. 
That also means the number of donor projects increased. The most important feature of 
aid fragmentation is coordination. Or lack of coordination, to be precise. A lot of donors 
mean a lot of coordination to make the work done fruitfully and not to overlap with each 
other. The lower the level of aid fragmentation, the bigger the effect received from the 
aid - good communication and close cooperation with partners and other donors help to 
avoid bureaucracy, overlapping and wasting resources. 
In theory, all the interviewees agreed that good coordination is essential but in practice it 
is much more complicated. It is not only about donor coordination, it is also about the 
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communication between donor and recipient country and between donor and local 
partners. „Everybody would like to coordinate and cooperate but nobody wants to be 
coordinated“ (Interview with Zhuravel, 16.04.2019). Both Gronvius (Interview, 
27.03.2019) and Disler (Interview, 11.03.2019) believe that the aid in Ukraine is 
fragmented because in comparison to other development countries, government 
coordination is fairly weak. Zhuravel (Interview, 16.04.2019) explained in detail how the 
coordination works on governmental level, but he was hesitating if it really is successful 
or not. In addition to government coordination, there is also a coordination between the 
donors which was considered better but still problematic. “Everybody [donors] say that 
there is no sense to duplicate and do the same thing alone in one’s own corner but in 
reality, it [coordination] just does not work” (Interview with Ennok, 08.05.2019). Disler 
(Interview, 11.03.2019) agrees with her: “Even within one donor there is quite a lot to 
coordinate and then, when we are looking at all of us collectively – national donors, 
international organisations… It is almost impossible to solve it [donor coordination]”. 
Reasons behind aid fragmentation are different. When it comes to government 
coordination, then Ukraine is characterised by weak institutions and poor governance. If 
the ministry responsible for donor coordination has not taken a strong role from the 
beginning, and the coordination of the ministerial level depends on the politician on 
power, then government coordination can be volatile. Another reason is that Ukraine is a 
priority country for only a handful of donors – Estonia, Lithuania, Poland. Others are also 
present in Ukraine, yet it is not a priority for them. This means that there are not enough 
people working on this problem [aid fragmentation] and it just overwhelming to deal with 
everything that is required to decrease the level of aid fragmentation (Interview with 
Ennok, 08.05.2019). 
Security 
The issue of security in Ukraine is two-folded – on the one side, there is an ongoing war 
in the eastern part of Ukraine, and on another side, the question is how rapid change in 
security affects the work of donor organisations. During the interviews, I used the 
example of the incident on the Azov Sea in November 2018 which brought Ukraine again 
onto the radar for international community. Among the interviewed participants, there 
were none for whom security threat would be a serious factor that could affect heavily 
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providing development aid. “It is a contingency, but it does not affect day-to-day 
management of most programmes” (Interview with Gronvius, 04.01.2019). He thinks that 
misusing laws to counteract reforms is a bigger concern, but it is not related to security 
(Ibid.). Ukraine is generally considered a safe country for development cooperation. 
Disler (Interview, 11.03.2019) argues that security is a concern in the eastern part where 
the conflict is but most of the projects are anyhow not affected because they are far away 
from the conflict. 
Gregor Brömling (Interview, 04.01.2019) from GIZ noted that situation in security 
encompasses certain regulations one has to follow but despite it being time-consuming 
and more complex procedure, all the work is manageable. If previous was about security 
affecting donor aid organisations and their work, then another question is how it affects 
local partners. Security contains uncertainty and the risk for instability. Brömling (Ibid.) 
also brought out that in case of emergency there are few security procedures which the 
local partners have to establish: “Cooperation with us for them at that time is not a 
priority. If they are busy with other things, then of course, they cannot focus on project 
implementation with us.” This happens when a certain project takes place in the eastern 
part of Ukraine – GIZ is working with local partners from Zaporizhia, Dnipro, Kharkiv 
and in government-controlled areas in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Ennok (Interview, 
08.05.2019) said that every such situation in security obviously affects but everything 
depends on what and where it happens: “When Azov Sea happened, then we had to assess 
the situation with the consul and our partners started to ask immediately what happened 
and how can it affect our work. In reality, it was more of an emotional effect because 
everything was unclear.” She added that generally Estonian development cooperation was 
not affected, and all the projects continued as they were. 
I think that a good example of security not being a concern is the “Opinion Festival” 
which was organised by the NGO Mondo and which has taken place in Severodonetsk 
two years in a row (2017 and 2018). Severodonetsk is less than 50 kilometres from the 
contact line in Eastern Ukraine. Judging by the fact that hundreds of people are getting 
together to discuss over variety of topics from the reforms in education and healthcare 
sector to local politics and culture (Terevisioon, 2017), one could claim that security 
really is not such a big concern. It affects people’s everyday life in one way or another, 
but development assistance is effectively provided. 
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“Gradually, the security issue fades into the background and the reform issues gain the 
upper hand” (GIZ, 2018: 64). I believe it fits for the conclusion of security topic. At 
certain point one cannot blame war and crisis anymore for not making efforts for the 
reforms. “The political elites can no longer use the war in the Donbass as an excuse for 
the reform deadlock” (Ibid.). 
Corruption 
Corruption is by far one of the most burning problems in Ukraine. It affects every part of 
the society, but interviewees did not see it as a serious concern for the implementation of 
development projects. Reasons for that are different for every donor country. Ennok 
(Interview, 08.05.2019) said that the budget for Estonian development projects in Ukraine 
is so small that together with having trustworthy local partners, Estonia is able to monitor 
well what is done with this money. In case of Estonia, having a fight against corruption 
as one of the country’s priorities, is also helpful. She added that several problems, among 
which is also corruption, for Estonia are avoided due to the limited budget and the 
smallness of Estonian Development Cooperation. Disler (Interview, 08.05.2019) argued 
that corruption is still one of the biggest impediments to reforms. That is the reason why 
implementation of Swiss development aid is still rather conservative: “The way we work 
is fairly traditional because there is still too much corruption in the system and the 
standards are often too low. Thus, budget support is not seen as an option” (Ibid.). 
Although some steps, such as creating the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, 
have been undertaken to reduce the level of corruption, the battle against it is still not 
overly successful. Thus, an excessive control is needed: “As soon as we give them 
financial support, there are very strict reporting rules – they are double-checked, and they 
have to undergo through certain procedures (Interview with Brömling, 04.01.2019). On 
a positive note, there are also steps taken against corruption which have been successful, 
argues Gordiienko (Interview, 09.12.2018), and names PROZORRO online procurement 
system as an example. 
Gronvius (Interview, 04.01.2019) argues how it is difficult to say how the level of 
corruption affects the provision of aid because typically it does not happen that local 
partners are asking for “a brown envelope.” He added that what may happen is that local 
counterparts blocking certain components of reforms which may increase transparency or 
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create more rules, thus threatening and limiting their ability to seek rents. “That is what 
we are combating – we are not trying to catch people offering brown envelope, but we 
are trying to change the political culture which is based on individual form of power to 
the one which is based on the normative rules” (Interview with Gronvius, 04.01.2019). 
Targeting and timing 
Targeting in the context of development aid is important because: 1) only aid which really 
helps to make a difference should be provided, and 2) it helps to avoid overlapping. 
Development aid has to be in the interest of a country where it is provided, not a country 
who is providing. All interviewees confirmed the necessity of targeting. For example, 
Khudur (Interview, 17.12.2019) stated: „Before making a decision, we have to see what 
others are doing… We try to avoid doing the same things others have done.“ Another 
argument is that aid is provided in the areas where donor country has extensive know-
how and experience. „We have been working on these issues [healthcare] for more than 
a decade. We are doing things we have always done“ (Interview with Disler, 11.03.2019). 
Providing aid has to be thought-through and well-managed. One can only make a 
difference if it has a proper understanding of what, why and how to provide. Having a 
fruitful and long-term cooperation for both sides can also increase recipient country’s 
commitment to the reforms and development. “GIZ is working almost for 10 years with 
that topic [energy efficiency] and they [Ukraine] are approaching us first when it comes 
to this topic. They want to be involved or want to get the knowledge on what we have 
established here, to use it for their own institutions” (Interview with Brömling, 
04.01.2019). This is an example of targeting done right because recipient country has also 
taken an active role in its development. Disler (Interview, 11.03.2019) agrees with 
Brömling: “Now it seems that they [Ukraine] are taking another approach – they don’t 
want to be only informed but they want to participate in discussions.” On the other hand, 
“it can put a pressure on us because they may request something we don’t want to do or 
there are things more important [to be done]…” (Ibid.). In order to avoid doing something 
that recipient government has requested but donor has no interest, it is useful to work 
together with civil society and local organisations. The truths that are told by politicians 
and local citizens tend to be different sometimes, and civil society organisations can often 
express the needs better. In that sense, Ukraine is in the good hands because it is often 
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said that Ukraine’s civil society is well-developed and that can be brought as an example 
to other countries. 
When it is the right time to intervene – this is not less important factor than is targeting. 
It is important to identify when the certain area actually has the genuine momentum and 
that’s the time to invest. It also creates some preparatory work to make that momentum 
to exist and prepare the ground… but timing in that respect is hugely important (Interview 
with Gronvius, 27.03.2019). For example, Under Yanukovych’s power between 2010-
2013, there was not much of an activity in the field of donor projects because the demand 
was missing; when Poroshenko got to the power after the Revolution of Dignity, demand 
for the reforms increased rapidly (Interview with Zhuravel, 27.12.2018). Gronvius 
(Interview, 27.03.2019) thinks the same that under the current government24, a lot of 
reforms have have started or picked up their speed. 
Timing is also related to other factors – knowledge of local conditions and corruption. 
Ennok said that there is a general excitement always when a new project starts to be 
implemented but after a while when certain stakeholders see what effects it actually 
brings, then the excitement can cool down pretty fast. As an example, she used the 
development of all the e-solutions which is one of the priorities for Estonia. There was a 
project which in the beginning was highly welcomed for increasing efficiency and 
creating more transparency but in the end, it was not possible to move on with the project 
anymore because certain sides started to work against it when they realised that these 
same increased efficiency and transparency can have a negative effect to their income. 
(Interview with Ennok, 08.05.2019)  
Although, in my opinion it is a bit disputable if livelihood-programme is humanitarian or 
development aid (I tend to think the latter), timing is necessary there as well. Janson 
(Interview, 23.03.2018) argued over the importance of supporting the livelihood sector 
when Estonian Refugee Council finished providing food aid to Ukrainians affected by the 
crisis. He said that they wanted to provide people a fishing rod not fish because long-term 
food aid is not very sustainable. Thus, it is important to understand when it is necessary 
to change the focus of intervention to get the most out of foreign aid. From the other 
                                                          
24 This interview was done before the president’s election in April and resignation of government in May. 
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perspective – when there is a lack of demand for development assistance, but the demand 
occurs rapidly, one should think why the desire for one or another donor project increased 
so suddenly – timing is something that politicians could also use for themselves (before 
elections). In that case, donors should critically evaluate the real motivation behind it. 
Worst case scenario is that the real motivation for reforms lies behind getting fast 
popularity before the elections. This, in turn, could mean that demand can be decreased 
soon after. 
Retrospect to the provided aid 
To conclude the interviews, I also asked the practitioners to look back to the work they 
have been doing in Ukraine in development sphere and kind of evaluate if things in 
Ukraine have been changing for better or not. By “kind of evaluation” I mean that I did 
not ask for any other measurement than their own opinion which is always subjective – 
“more of a gut feeling than the assessment based on the hard facts” (Interview with Disler, 
11.03.2019). Clearly, this question for them was the hardest to answer but I believe that 
with a brief retrospect to the provided aid I could shed some light to the effectiveness of 
development aid in Ukraine. Hopefully this question worked also as a good game of 
thought for them before leaving their current post (which many of them are going to do 
soon). 
Gronvius (Interview, 27.03.2019) from SIDA argued that in case of Ukraine, the glass if 
rather half full than half empty. He supports this thought with the following:  
“I think there is a cause for careful optimism. There is the understanding among 
government counterparts that certain reforms are necessary, and they have had positive 
effect… There seems to be a willingness… and it depends on from which angle you are 
looking from – you can see both positive and negative… There are people who say that it 
is better than it has ever been, other people say that is is all a mirage – oligarchs are still 
holding power, fight against corruption hasn’t been successful etc.” 
Disler (Interview, 11.03.2019) from SDC agreed that glass is rather half full than half 
empty and he was also cautiously optimistic when answering this question:  
“Generally, it is difficult to say whether Ukraine is really doing better… It is what we 
would like to see… On the other hand, the conflict is still there, people are still dying, 
IDPs are struggling… At the same time, it is not in our hands, and we cannot really 
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influence [conflict management]. The more you go down to the concrete things you are 
doing, the more you see encouraging things. There are good things achieved 
[decentralisation, e-governance, stronger civil society] Measures have been taken and 
time will tell [if aid has changed things for better or not]. 
When it comes to Estonia, then for Villsaar (Interview, 18.02.2019) it seemed that things 
have changed for better – Estonian organisations have gotten more experience and they 
have been able to create the added value with their success stories. Ennok (Interview, 
08.05.2019) argued that despite of not contributing to Ukraine’s development with a big 
amount of money and due to focusing more on individuals, rather than big projects, 
Estonian Development Cooperation has had a tremendous impact. On the other hand, 
when viewing the bigger picture, then improving is really slow: „There is a part of society 
who is doing better but the same cannot be said about the country as a whole. We help so 
much [aid to Ukraine in general) but then one problem appears, second, third… Impact 
rather reaches the individuals but from country’s perspective it has not been so effective” 
(Ibid.). 
Zhuravel said that it is complicated to measure the effectiveness of the reforms because 
there has been a lot of them in Ukraine – some more, some less advanced; in some sectors 
more, in other sectors less. More important question, in his opinion, is whether the work 
that has been done continues: “There has been a lot of trainings, study visits, experience 
exchanges. There are so many good examples. Instead of saying “we can never achieve 
it [good examples seen abroad] in Ukraine”, local leaders should say “we have seen how 
thing are successfully done abroad, we can now do the same things but even better.”” 
(Interview with Zhuravel, 16.04.2019) 
For Gordiienko positive tendencies prevail: “Ukrainian government after the Revolution 
of Dignity was headed by the newly appointed reformers which changed their attitude to 
ownership of the reforms and changes supported and fostered by development aid. They 
started planning and prioritizing and thinking strategically where the international 
resources [expertise and know-how] are needed and where these could be applied the 
most. Also, as aid has become more demand-based, government has started to voice the 
real needs and increased the capabilities in planning and co-implementing assistance 
projects.” She also had some criticism: “Development aid has made sponsored 
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consultants doing the work which should normally be done by local public officials a 
norm. Also, development aid has spoilt NGOs in a way - huge inflow of grants has slightly 
shifted motivation towards “implementation, reporting and getting new grants” rather 
than actually making a difference for the citizens themselves.” (Interview with 
Gordiienko, 17.04.2019) 
4.3. Discussion 
Above is the analysis of factors which I believe affect the provision of effective 
development aid the most – knowledge of local conditions, tied aid, aid fragmentation, 
security, corruption, targeting and timing. I believe this is a relatively comprehensive 
framework to work with. I do not claim that there cannot be other factors affecting the 
provision of aid, but I believe these are the most important. From that it seems to me that 
I have managed to answer the first research question posed in the introduction – what are 
the most important factors affecting the provision of effective development aid? There is 
one limitation though, which came up in the process of writing the aid effectiveness sub-
chapter - there is no good way for measuring the effectiveness of aid. At least, literature 
on effectiveness suggests that economic growth as a measurement does not work. By the 
definition, aid effectiveness would mean that a right (amount) of aid is provided to deal 
with certain problems. In order to provide a right (amount) of aid for a certain problem, 
one needs precise objectives and indicators. To add a “measurable dimension” to aid 
effectiveness, I suggest agreeing on fulfilling a certain percentage of project/programme 
objectives (for example, 75% of objectives) that have to be fulfilled in order to consider 
aid effective. This could make aid agencies think more about their intervention to be sure 
that set objectives are achievable. On the other hand, there are several questions which 
do need an in-depth research – how to set the right requirements? how to enforce it to the 
donor countries and aid agencies? 
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Factors External Internal 
Knowledge of local conditions + - 
Tied aid + - 
Aid fragmentation + + 
Security - + 
Corruption - + 
Targeting and timing + + 
For better understanding, I have decided to divide them into two categories – external and 
internal. External factor means that it is donor-specific, and it does not depend on the 
recipient country. Internal factor means that it is country-specific, and it does not depend 
on the donor. Knowledge of local conditions is external – local conditions refers to 
recipient country, but the extent local conditions are taken into consideration and used for 
the provision of aid, is up to donor. Tied aid is also external – only donors themselves can 
decide how much of an aid and how they are tying. Aid fragmentation can be both external 
and internal – one question is how donors among themselves are coordinating the aid for 
it not to be fragmented (external), another is recipient government coordination (internal). 
Security and corruption are both internal – level of security or whether corruption rate is 
low or high do not depend on donor country (of course, if they are not contributing to it 
somehow). Lastly, targeting and timing can depend both on donor and recipient countries. 
Donors decides what kind of aid when to provide, and so does recipient – what kind of 
aid when to request. 
To answer the second research question – how could these factors be applied to Ukrainian 
context? – I based on the interviews with development aid practitioners and their 
contribution helped me answering that. Knowledge of local conditions in the recipient 
country is undoubtedly the most important here. Not knowing the conditions in the 
recipient country refers to the possibility of using one-size-fits-all approach which can be 
dangerous for the success of development project. Ukraine is a unique country with a lot 
of distinguishing features from its oligarchic system to Soviet legacy to its size and 
population. I believe that practitioners I interviewed for this thesis together summed up 
well how important is to know the context where one is planning to implement an aid 
intervention. Another factor which in Ukraine’s case poses a serious concern is aid 
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fragmentation. Easterly (2007: 639-640) calls donor coordination one of the chronic 
problems in foreign aid: “A maddening problem in foreign aid for all concerned are the 
huge administrative costs for both recipients and donors from the duplication of donor 
efforts and their failure to coordinate their efforts with each other.” Every interviewed 
practitioner saw aid fragmentation as a problem, but nobody was quite sure what should 
be done to solve this problem. As Zhuravel succinctly said – everybody supports more 
coordination and cooperation, but nobody wants to be coordinated. Ukraine not being a 
priority recipient country for most of the donors does not make finding a solution easier. 
The biggest development programme in Ukraine today is “U-LEAD with Europe” which 
is done in cooperation of five countries – Germany, Sweden, Poland, Denmark and 
Estonia. When talking about success in development cooperation, then this programme is 
often brought as an example. To see what good could be done together with several 
countries may in the long run affect aid fragmentation positively as well.  
In the third factor which is a serious concern for the society – corruption – practitioners 
did not see much how it could affect providing aid. That is also about the knowledge of 
local conditions – donors know that the level of corruption in the country is very high, 
thus they can plan their activities accordingly. It happens rarely in Ukraine when bribe is 
asked to continue with the development project. That is why it is not seen as a much of a 
problem. As it was said above, it is more about the political economy and political culture 
and work to improve these are constantly done. Fourth factor which again is a serious 
concern for the whole Ukraine – security – was also what practitioners did not consider 
as something that could affect providing aid negatively. The reason is simple – most of 
the aid projects are done everywhere else than in the eastern part of Ukraine where is the 
warzone and if something is implemented near the contact line then it is highly regulated. 
When it comes to something sudden which may happen – as the incident on the Azov Sea 
in November 2018 – then again, despite of martial law and some limitations, it did not 
affect implementing aid projects. Another factor which as well does not affect providing 
aid in Ukraine is tied aid. It poses a problem mostly when it comes to big infrastructure 
projects which requires a lot of resources – both materials and workforce. In Ukraine 
there are no such projects. Using international experts can be taken as a tied aid but 
without them would be impossible to implement projects. The bottom line is that aid is 
tied as much as reasonable and necessary for the projects. Last but not least, there was 
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targeting and timing factor which I analysed. Targeting definitely is important because it 
helps to provide aid that is really needed, and it helps to avoid overlapping. It did not 
seem, though, that in Ukraine it is a problem because donor countries have their certain 
focus areas where they usually have a long experience, and for which they are trusted. 
Timing, on the other hand, is a bigger concern because it may happen that there is no 
political will to implement the reforms. It is important to catch the right momentum and 
start working, as said Gronvius (Interview, 27.03.2019). It may happen that it takes a lot 
of time for the right time to arrive but in that case, it is smarter to re-focus one’s activities, 
for example, going from government level to regional or choosing another region. 
Ukraine with its size offers a lot of possibilities for that. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
Conclusion 
The question of foreign aid has been at issue since the end of the World War II. Today 
the discussion over aid has gathered even more attention. If in the beginning of provision 
of aid, it was only meant to the former colonies who started to become independent, and 
the realisation that they will not manage by themselves, occurred, then today there are a 
bit less than 150 countries and territories25 getting aid in one way or another. It is hard to 
distinguish which country gets humanitarian aid, which development aid and which 
country both combined. This thesis, though, focuses on development aid. To be more 
precise, the focus is on the factors affecting the provision of effective development aid. 
Before moving on to these factors, I gave a short overview of what has been studied before 
– aid and political stability, aid effectiveness, the problems that make aid not working. 
This gave me a feeling that studying the factors affecting the provision of development 
aid could be the one which has not got much attention. Due to different reasons I decided 
to study this topic with a focus on Ukraine.  
This thesis is divided into four bigger parts. The first part of this thesis is theoretical 
framework which aims to help grasping the topic better. Sub-chapter 1.1.1. gives a brief 
overview of the history of development aid; 1.1.2. introduces readers the key IR concepts 
of development aid; 1.1.3. is kind of a continuation to the previous one, showing why 
countries provide aid; and 1.1.4. shortly introduces how and why aid has been criticised. 
Chapter 1.2. about aid effectiveness aims to open up the question of what the name refers 
to – aid effectiveness. It is impossible to study the provision of effective development aid 
if it is unclear what lies behind the concept. Chapter 1.3. introduces the factors I decided 
to work with in this research. The second part concentrates on research design and 
methodology. I explain why I chose to base my work on these countries, explain my 
research method and explain the limitations I was thinking my work could have. The 
purpose of the third part is to give a short overview of the recipient country – Ukraine – 
and four donor countries – Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Estonia.  
Last major part – analysis together with discussion – is the most important. It seeks to 
answer my second research question which I posed in introduction. Factors I identified 
                                                          
25 List of ODA countries 
62 
 
and investigated in my thesis were as following: knowledge of local conditions, tied aid, 
aid fragmentation, security, corruption, targeting and timing. I believe that it is a 
comparatively complete framework which comprises the most important and 
fundamental features about the provision of aid. I also divided these factors into two 
categories – external and internal – depending on whether it is donor-specific or recipient-
specific. External factors were knowledge of local conditions and tied aid, internal 
security and corruption, and the rest – aid fragmentation, targeting and timing fit to both 
categories.  
Out of seven, the factors which were the most represented, i.e. applicable to Ukrainian 
context as factors that affect the provision of development aid the most are the knowledge 
of local conditions together with aid fragmentation. Due to Ukraine’s uniqueness, it is 
logical that there has to be a comprehensive overview of the situation in the country. This 
actually applies to every country where development aid is provided. Another factor is 
aid fragmentation which in Ukraine is caused by the big number of donors and the 
constant failure to coordinate one’s actions with each other. The problem with aid 
fragmentation is that nobody really does not know how to decrease it. One can say that 
there has to be closer cooperation and better communication but again – how to achieve 
it? Another two factors which are important in planning and implementing an aid project 
are targeting and timing. Targeting in Ukraine is not a problem because all the donors 
have their focus areas, in which they are providing aid. Timing in Ukraine can be a bit 
more problematic because not always there is a need for reforms, thus development aid. 
Here it is very important to catch the momentum when the demand exists, but one has to 
be careful – the demand for aid can be short-term and related to upcoming elections. 
Last three factors – tied aid, corruption and security – can be applied to Ukrainian context 
as well but they do not affect the provision of development aid as much as does aid 
fragmentation, for example. Tied aid does not affect because Ukraine does not big 
infrastructure projects which are usually linked to tied aid. Also, using international 
experts instead of local ones can be considered tied aid as well but this is not seen as a 
problem as long as it is necessary and reasonable. Corruption is a serious concern to 
Ukraine’s society. It hinders the reforms but for development aid it is not very big 
concern. The reason here is that it happens rarely when bribe is required in order to start 
or continue some development project. Last but not least, security – this factor was also 
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something that surprisingly to not affect the provision of aid much because most of the 
projects are undertaken in the areas where it is safe, and the level of security is high. 
To conclude with, I believe I managed to answer both research questions posed in the 
introduction. It is far beyond the scope of this research to offer fundamental changes for 
the improvement of development aid, but I believe that knowing how one or another 
factor affects the provision of aid could help us here. At least it could offer us a 
perspective from where to start. When coming back to Ukraine, then the most critical 
seems to be aid fragmentation because there are so many things to do in Ukraine in 
development sphere that it is regrettable that a huge part of aid just vanishes because 
different donors, for one reason or another, are not communicating or cooperating 
properly. 
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